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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the roles of the Rakan Muda youth programme in Malaysia,
and in particular at its role as a crime prevention mechanism. This analysis of the social
construction of youth problems is done in the context of rapid industrialisation and
urbanisation in Malaysia, with a special focus on the eastern state of Sarawak. The thesis
use three sets of data: information from the Ministry of Youth and Sport which
administers the scheme, items from both peninsula and Sarawak newspapers, and
interviews with thirty members of the Rakan Muda programme in Kuching, Sarawak.
Young people are considered by the authorities to be 'at risk' of criminal involvement.
Accordingly, their behaviour, especially their leisure activities, are highly publicised by
the media, more so when those activities are perceived to contradict the norms and values
of Malaysian society. The Rakan Muda programme allows the authorities to interfere in
young people's lifestyle while claiming to ensure that the young do not deviate from these
norms and values. This thesis examines the mechanisms by which the government does
I

this, and makes some tentative proposals on how young people might read the
government's intent.
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CHAPTER 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION

Although concern over the perceived moral decay of the young generation in
Malaysia is not new, the issues currently being discussed are. Those issues reflect a
concern with the by-products of modernity resulting from urbanisation and
industrialisation, especially violence, social dislocation, experimentation with new sexual
mores, new forms of escapism such as "loafing" {lepak in colloquial Bahasa Malaysia)
and drug-taking. Government statistics show a rising divorce rate, later marriages, urban
drift and a breakdown of the network of social support and services including extended
family (Ariffm: 1995, pp. 343-371). Recent reports published by the Ministry of Youth
and Sport (1994; 1995; 1996) show an increase in crime committed by the young
generation. The media also produces stories depicting the young generation as easily led
victims of rapid social and cultural change. All individuals in Malaysia experience the
effects of these changes but the young people are seen as the most vulnerable and least
equipped to deal with them, tending to suffer a greater risk of deviant involvement.
Within this context, my purpose is to try and examine the youth "problem" as a
social phenomenon in Malaysia. I want to focus on the experiences of young people in
the nexus of increasing industrialisation (in particular the modern fast-paced lifestyle in
Kuching, East Malaysia), the media and the family, and to problematise privileged or
mainstream accounts of the youth problem.
To begin with, the apparent increases in crime need to be questioned. In Malaysia
the definition of youth is fraught with difficulties, not only because of variations in police

crime statistics but also because there is no uniform definition. Definitions vary not only
between departments but also within the Ministry of Youth and Sport itself, as
responsibility for defining youth is delegated to a variety of government departments. In
Malaysia, young people can: be in part held responsible for crime at the age of 10; be
liable to pay full fare on public transport at the age of 12; undertake employment at the
age of 15; cease to attend full-time education at 15; vote, be send to adult prison and be
entitled to a driving licence at the age of 18 (Department of Statistics: 1993).
According to the Malaysian Federal Police Department (1997), the young
generation is made up of males and females aged between 10 and 18 years. However, the
major definition of the Ministry of Youth and Sport extends the category to include those
aged up to 25 years. Yet when implementing youth programmes, the Ministry extends
the category even further to include people aged from 26 to 39 years (Ministry of Youth
and Sport: 1994, p. 2). These inconsistencies help to illustrate that there is no clear age at
which young people are seen to emerge from the "problematic" period in the Ministry's
view. Legal definitions of childhood, youth and adulthood have been developed by the
different institutions of government for different purposes and at different moments in
history. This complication of definitions certainly does not aid a clear definition of
"young people". For example, the police definition is used to check levels of youth crime
while other definitions are used for the purpose of policy making, in particular by the
Ministry of Youth and Sport when recruiting members for its Rakan Muda programme.
For the purpose of this thesis, I have focused on youths aged between 15 and 26. In other
words, I adopt one of the major definitions used by the Ministry of Youth and Sport when
targeting its policies. This group forms the largest category of young people involved in

the Ministry's programmes, and in particular the Rakan Muda programme which is the
focus of this thesis.
Concerns about the youth problem allow the government to intervene in social
behaviour. According to Pyvis, generallly the goal of government intervention "seems to
be, to make use of the young, to control them, to ready them to serve rather than to serve
them. The needs of youth are determined by those in power - a coterie of elders, and
their aim is apparently to produce a manageable youth population willing and able to do
their bidding" (1992: p. 18). Training and education programmes are the key features of
Malaysian youth policy, and they rely on a view as being deficient in skills, knowledge
and attitudes of moral obligation and discipline (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995, pp.
7-9; Yassin: 1995, pp. 3-11). This kind of policy approach builds on the assumption that
the causes of youth related social problems lie with the youths themselves. The failure of
young people to match social expectations renders them both a curse and an
encumbrance. The solution lies in overcoming their deficiencies and making them more
amenable to discipline (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995, p. 2). Youth policy, in this
view, is a form of social control.
Given this, one aim of my study is to explore the way in which the youth question
is problematised by state institutions, especially the Ministry of Youth and Sport. In
1994 the Ministry of Youth and Sport introduced the Rakan Muda (Youth) programme,
aimed primarily at lessening the problems associated with juvenile delinquency. The
immediate goal of the programme is to establish services and infrastructure capable of
supporting the needs of the young generation.

Although still in its infancy, the

programme has generated responses from various parties including government

representatives, non-government organisation (NGOs), as well as sections of the public
such as academics and business leaders. Underlying their concerns are questions as to
whether the programme is an appropriate response to the youth issue {New Straits Times.
27/2/1997, p. 7; The Star Online. 6/4/1997; New Straits Times. 11/3/1997, p. 13).
One body of opinion suggests that young people are the victims of today's
changing social environment {Sarawak Tribune Online. 21/4/1997; New Straits Times\
13/2/1997; New Straits Times. 11/3/1997, p. 13) in which changes occur in social
expectations, social relationships, peer influences, media portrayals and other pressures.
Mardzuki argues that "young people are exposed to greater social expectations from
school and job markets. Some changes in social and peer relationships are reflected in
the increase in pre- and extra-marital relationships and social groupings that do not
conform to traditional family patterns. Young people also admit greater access to media
information and influence' {Sarawak Tribune. 25/7/96).
Malaysia is fast industrialising (Jomo:

1992; Bowie:

1994), a process

accompanied by many social changes, sometimes traumatic. Individuals feel the effects
of these changes and adjust or react to them more immediately than social institutions and
policy makers.

When a country undergoes industrialisation, lifestyles change and

Malaysia is now experiencing this process where young people are caught in the midst of
urban transformation and development {New Straits Times: 5/3/1997, p. 7). In this view
it is not fair to place blame on the young because they are deemed to be overwhelmed by
tremendous social and psychological pressures beyond their control.
In contrast, media images tend to present the young in Malaysia as the purveyors
of trouble or as a threat to society because of their intensity in the pursuit of "fun" {New

Straits Times. 5/3/1997, p. 19; The Star Online. 6/4/97; Milton: 1995, p. 37). In Malaysia
the media have identified the phenomenon of lepak, bohsia and hohjan^ (to be discussed
in more detail in chapter 4) which together capture the lifestyle of the young, presenting
them as sexually and morally deviant. Constructing them in such images contributes to
the creation of a moral panic (Cohen: 1973, p. 69). For this reason, my thesis also
involves an analysis of media coverage. This analysis is then counterposed by interviews
with young people in Sarawak, the state capital of Kuching in East Malaysia.

The

interviews are important because often in the process of developing policy on youth
problems the voices of the young are given little or no prominence.

1.1 Limits and Contribution of this study
Very little work has been done on youth in Malaysia and youth policy in
particular. Spencer and Navaratnam's (1980) study looks at drug use among youths in
secondary school in Malaysia. The study focuses on youthful drug use in relation to selfassertion against a set of beliefs and attitudes about drugs and drug taking. Their findings
indicate that the new pattern of drug use by youth has transcended older cultural
differences between the Malaysian states and is in turn explained by a more universally
familiar set of characteristics in adolescent development. A second study by Jamilah
Ariffm (1995) discusses the nature and impact of economic and social change in
Malaysia. Her analysis of country and local level statistics indicates that changes have
created a widening gap between the values of the traditional culture and the expectations
of the younger generation. Ariffm suggested that these circumstances promote anomie as
the young struggle to resolve the conflict between their local cultural background and

Western notions of individual success. Although traditional moral values have not been
forgotten, the desire to achieve financial success has become primary to many and this
reordering of priorities has led to escalating crime rates among the young. Further, she
argues that child abuse and other forms of anomie expression have increased as the
extended family support system of the past disappears in the new mobile society.
My research is slightly different because it focuses on the social construction of
youth problems in the context of the Rakan Muda programme as a crime prevention
mechanism. Unlike Ariffm, I do not regard statistics of youth crime as self-evident.
Rather, I consider them to be one of the mechanisms in the exercise of power, the other
being the media imagery. This study also focuses on young people involved in Rakan
Muda themselves, exploring the way in which they negotiate what government, media
and society perceive to be a problem in Malaysia. Since no similar study in the state of
Sarawak has been written, this thesis is largely exploratory.
There are thirteen states in Malaysia. Peninsular Malaysia consists of eleven
states while East Malaysia has two states, Sabah and Sarawak. Most government youth
policy originates from the federal government in Kuala Lumpur, on the Peninsula. In
context of Malaysia federalism, Sarawak is considered peripheral to the "real" social and
political developments taking place in Peninsular Malaysia (King: 1990; Majid Cooke:
1997). In this context, government policy is often formulated to fit the Peninsula's
conditions and simply transferred to Sarawak, despite the differences in social
development and historical conditions.

1.2 Industrialisation and social problems
Industrialisation took over as the lead sector in the economy as Malaysia entered
the 1980s.

This change is having a dramatic social impact.

The rapid pace of

industrialisation in Malaysia created jobs for both urban dwellers and migrants from the
countryside, and was based largely on cheap supplies of an unskilled, poorly educated
and submissive workforce, mainly single men and women from rural areas. However it
also contributed to social problems in the county because of the pace of change. Even
though industrialisation affects almost all individuals in Malaysia, it is young people who
tend to experience more pressure.
Associated with industrialisation has been a series of important changes affecting
rural-urban migration.

Rural migration to urban areas increased in both volume and

speed after the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1972.

Malay

urbanisation proceeded more rapidly that of other ethnic groups, and a significant part of
the most recent Malay migration to the main cities has comprised young single persons
seeking employment at low wages in unskilled factory jobs.

This aspect of Malay

migration is liable to produce a social revolution in Malay life, because the returns from
such employment are adequate only for a single unmarried life, not for establishing a
family, whilst the prospects of advancement and for higher earning power for a large
proportion of these low-skilled workers are not good. This plus the removal of young
people from the guidance and assistance of the elder people in their village society, and
their exposure to unprecedented freedom in personal behaviour, are liable to produce
adaptation problems in the new social environment of the cities.

I will now move on to discuss in more detail the literature on these momentous
changes taking place in Malaysia, in order to situate more clearly the concerns about
youth.

^ Bohsia or Bohjan are colloquial Bahasa Malaysia terms used to label those engaging in pre-marital,
extra-marital or multiple sexual relationships. Bohsia refers to females, while Bohjan refers to males.

CHAPTER 2
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

Deviance, crime and disorder occur in every society and Malaysia is no exception.
Yet most people in Malaysia probably live in an environment that is relatively safe. What
accounts, then, for the perception that crime and deviance have gotten worse or even out
of hand? This literature review looks at the concept of moral panic and evaluates its
usefulness as a mechanism for exercising power in order to effect social control over
young people in Malaysia. State publications and media debates about youth problems are
examined, and social change in Sarawak is examined within the larger context of economic
and political development in Malaysia as a whole.

2.1 Young people and the question of control
Historical evidence seems to indicate that the present era in Malaysia is in many
ways less violent and crime-ridden than at other times since independence in 1957. For
instance, the May 13th riots in 1969 were characterised by racial conflict and public chaos,
and were the culmination of a period in which ethnic tolerance was low and both Chinese
and Malays felt unsafe and threatened (Osman-Rani: 1990, p. 204). Conflicts involving
ethnic minorities, corruption of prominent political figures and crime involving the young
all occurred in the late 19th century and earlier this century (Arififin: 1995). Yet crime,
especially that committed by the young generation, has recently made media headlines, and
electoral campaigns often focus on "get tough" policies {New Straits Times\ 11/3/1997, p.
13). In this context, the question as to whether crime rates are increasing and why is

important in understanding why youth crime has become an important public issue and to
appreciate what ends are served by highlighting it.
Social control has been employed widely by social scientists to refer to almost any
system or network of interactions, encounters and relations involving elements of power,
authority, coercion or repression (Edward: 1975). Stanley Cohen in Visions of Social
Control defines social control as: "all those social processes and methods through which
society ensures that its members conform to expectations.

These normally include

intemalisation, socialisation, education, peer group pressure, public opinion and the like as
well as the operations of specialised formal agencies such as the police, the law and all
other state power" (Cohen: 1985, p. 3).
This concept requires looking beyond the young generation itself to the larger
picture of the processes involved in the social construction of youth problems and the
corresponding questions of power and its exercise. What is taking place regarding youth
crime in Malaysia can be explained by using Tame's (1991) two approaches: Traditional
Conservativism and Authoritarian Populism. The Traditional Conservative approach view
of crime includes not only that activity which endangers property or the person but
morality as well (Tame: 1991). Hence, attacks on certain traditional values and people's
respect for the authorities in Malaysia can generally be viewed as criminal. From this
perspective, youth crime is not only a matter of free choice, it is also linked to certain
intrinsic aspects of humanity. In particular, people are seen as possessing certain natural
urges that go against the more civilised or divine purposes of society.

In order to

constrain these urges, it is necessary to establish a strong order based upon personal

sacrifice, self-discipline and submission to authorities (Tame: 1991).

Order must take

supremacy over all else, including justice. In other words, it is a priority to maintain order
for peace. Youth crime is said to be caused by the unwillingness of young people to
accept discipline, the undermining of traditional loyalties (such as to the patriarchal family)
and the pursuit of immediate individual gratification without appropriate hard work
(Ministry of Youth and Sports: 1995).
According to this approach, punishment, in terms of preventive coercion, is an
essential part of control.

This not only follows from personal responsibility for one's

actions but also because punishment has an important symbolic impact on society as a
whole. That is, punishment has to be seen in terms of its effect on the promotion of moral
solidarity through stigmatisation.

Strong emphasis is placed upon the importance of

morality in the maintenance of social authority.

Thus someone who does something

deemed to be wrong or harmful must be punished directly and appropriately in order to set
the moral standard. This view generally results in anti-libertarian views with respect to
pornography, sexual behaviour, drug use and abortion; that is, it favours intervention in
areas regarded as victimless crimes. Indeed, the conservative point of view often favours
increased state intervention in everyday social life because it is felt that only strong
coercive measures will ultimately keep people in line and teach them the discipline they
require to live as members of a civilised community.
Authoritarian Populism is also oriented to upholding traditional values as
expressed in the norms and sanctions of society.

This approach tends to provide a

moralistic and punitive approach to issues of crime and criminality (Tame: 1991). This

"get tough" approach has an appeal to people on the basis of "us versus them". The "us"
is always viewed as virtuous, while those labelled as "them" are viewed as parasites,
destroying the social body. In terms of youth crime, the essence of populism exaggerates
the dangerousness of crime and the foreign or alien nature of the criminal. The criminal is
seen to be outside the society - its networks, institutions, communities, mores, values and
ways of life. This is a part of essentialism. The treatment of young people by Malaysian
authorities in the legal system is an exaggerated version of a more general social control
policy to which all young people are subject. Young people tend to be more likely to
violate dominant and restrictive standards of morality so the authorities see the right to
control their morality.
The rhetoric of populism reduces all crime problems to very simple solutions.
Offenders are made entirely responsible for their actions, particularly when their lifestyle is
seen as being outside the mainstream institutions of society. Social distancing occurs at
the level of rhetoric and policy development. It is a short step from this to encouraging
simplistic solutions to the crime problem. If the problem is constructed as being one of
"us" against "them" solution is seen to lie in enhanced state power. What Malaysia is
experiencing at the moment can be compared to nineteenth century Europe, a period of
the consolidation of capitalism and the capitalist mode of production. This was a period
that witnessed major technological developments and the entrenchment of mass
production (rather than agricultural production or merchant trading) as the dominant form
of production and source of profit.

In Malaysia recent decades have seen the concentration of rural migrants into
major cities, the creation and expansion of the factory system, the introduction of new
production technologies and sources of energy and expanded communication and
transport networks. Changes in basic production techniques and relations, and the flow of
"cheap labour" into industrial employment has seen the emergence of a new social class the working class or proletariat.
This can be linked to the early essentialist theory of crime where the new
proletariat was seen as almost another species to be examined and controlled, and
distanced from elites. Individual traits can be discovered in offenders and these in turn can
be measured and classified in some way.
The focus of analysis therefore is on the nature and characteristics of the offender,
rather than on the criminal act. Offenders can be scientifically studied and their defects
can be diagnosed, classified and ultimately treated or dealt with in some way (Fishbein:
1990; Taylor, Walton and Young: 1973, p. 38). Because deviant behaviour sterns from
the individual, and is part of their character, the incidence of deviance cannot be assumed
to be fially reflected in officially recorded violations of the law. This is because the social
or moral consensus in society can be violated without necessarily being detected or
processed formally in the criminal justice system.
Authoritarian populism refers to a process in which crime is depicted in a series of
moral panics about law-and-order issues (Hall: 1980; Hall et al: 1978), where reliance is
put on showing offenders to be essentially deviant. The extent and seriousness of youth
crime is highlighted but not necessarily backed up by statistical and other research
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findings, and this in turn is used to justify harsher penalties and the spread of state
authorities into more and more spheres of young people's everyday life. The rationale
behind such intrusion is normally a combination of the protection of private property and
the differential treatment that should be meted out to the moral and immoral in society
(Hall: 1980).
The broad appeal of authoritarian populism is due in part to the pervasive influence
of the print and electronic media in conveying particular types of images of crime in
society (Grabosky and Wilson: 1989). The flooding of the media with stories about youth
crime has the real and pertinent effects of heightening people's fear of crime, feeding
stereotypes of the typical offender, over-emphasising the extent of extremely violent and
serious crimes, and fostering acceptance for policies which promise to get something
"done" about the crime problem.

2.2 Moral order and Moral Panic
According to the Ministry of Youth and Sport (1995) the focus on young people
as perpetrators of crime provides opportunities for various social action groups to make
claims about wider social problems, including changes affecting the nature of the family,
the relationship between families and the State, the apparent lack of morality and
responsibility among young people, unemployment, concerns about crime and personal
safety, the kinds of penalties that should be adopted, and the meaning of citizenship. It is
true that some young people commit serious, violent offences with hideous consequences.
However, most crimes are those of minor property damage (especially graffiti in public

places), motor vehicle theft and street offences {The Star Online: 6!A! 1991, p. 2). An
overwhelming focus on the risk of young people's involvement in crime fuels
contemporary debates on the efficacy of youth policy and invites suggestions for better
prevention. With the aid of news media that keep ratings high by sensationalising crime,
and of criminal justice officials who skilfully manipulate crime statistics, the result is a
virtually unshakeable public perception that crime is, at the very least, steadily rising and
possibly out of control. Social problems among young people are most newsworthy and
hardly a day passes without some aspects of them in the media. The upward trend in
numbers and the intensity of social problems have long been anticipated from coverage of
an upsurge in discipline problems since the late 1980s, especially in violent delinquent acts
such as vandalism, assault, extortion and gang fights.
The impression is that youth crime in Malaysia is a serious problem. However, is
this really the case or is public perception being moulded by relatively few but highly
publicised incidents? Despite the perception that youth crime is out of control, little
attempt has been made to examine whether the fears about escalating youth crime are
realistic. Cohen defines a moral panic as "a condition, episode, person or group of persons
which emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is
presented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media" (Cohen: 1985, p. 9).
In response to perceived problems, a youth programme called Rakan Muda was
established in Malaysia in October 1994. The programme was adopted as a result of the
government's concern with statistical evidence (Department of Statistics: 1993) of an
increasing rate of crime and delinquency associated with the young generation in Malaysia.

Even though the implementation of the programme will only reach its fourth year in
October 1998, the debate about the success or failure of the programme as a preventive
measure against crime and delinquency has raised issues with regard to government
discourse and media coverage. Individuals from government, NGOs, business leaders,
researchers and academics have questioned the integrity of the programme as a social
control mechanism.
According to the Ministry of Youth and Sport (1995, pp. 10-12) young people are
regarded as a key indicator of the state of the nation itself They are expected to reflect
the economic conditions, shifts in cultural values over sexuality, morality and family life,
changes in class relations, concepts of nationhood and occupational structures. Young
people are assumed to hold the key to the nation's ftiture and the treatment and
management of youth is expected to provide the solution to problems such as drug abuse,
"loafing", teenage pregnancy and teenage sexual relations (Ministry of Youth and Sport:
1995, pp. 13-15).
Differential reactions to authority and control are largely determined by the
experiences of young people in the wider community. As Howard Sercombe points out:
"Young people absorb, are co-opted into and generate a whole range of often fi-agmentary
ideologies with which they make sense of their lives. Some of those come from school,
some from living with parents, some from the media or the pronouncements of official
speakers, some from the grind and pleasures of a specific or shared life as a 15-year-old in
the 1990s. Some come from the way that architecture, urban planning, the space we have

to live in, is constructed. Some are imposed, some are inherited, some are invented. All
are adapted." (Sercombe: 1993, p. 35)
Young people are often the subject of interventionist policies implemented by law
and order institutions, education and social welfare systems as well as community-based
programmes designed for the purpose of crime prevention. Their voices, which are often
unheard, provide a disturbing account of powerlessness under various forms of
institutionalised social control (Sercombe: 1993, p. 35). Their opinions are based on
experiences of social control practices in contacts with the police, educational authorities,
in youth programmes or in society at large which are structured to generate well-behaved
and acceptable individuals in the community (Sercombe: 1993, p. 35).
Social policy in Malaysia emphasises individual success and power which is often
at odds with young people's relatively powerless position. Giddens (1990) offers usefiil
sociological insights which can assist our understanding of contemporary youth
experiences in developing countries. His work charts the nature of recent social changes
in late modernity, in particular the weakening of collectivist traditions and the
intensification of individual values. The result of these changes is that the individual is
increasingly held responsible by the state for his or her own fate. Accountability and
achievement are values which are constantly reinforced for young Malaysians by the
school system and the media.
For most people, their knowledge concerning crime does not come fi-om direct
experience of victimisation, detection of offending by authorities, nor fi-om academic
studies or policy documents. Rather, knowledge about deviance or crime by the young

generation is mediated and constructed through stories circulated in news broadcasts and
TV shows, the daily tabloids and talk-back commentaries.
These images cover only a limited terrain of possibilities. There are four broad
categories in contemporary representations of young people: the "ideal" young person; the
young as "threat"; young people as "victim"; and young people as "parasite".
Representation of young people as a threat dominates, however (White: 1990, p. 107).
Even though White's work based on Australian conditions, Malaysian youths are also
depicted in the same images (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995, pp. 10-15)
There is much research looking at the relationship between the young generation
and the media. Stan Cohen's classic work. Folk Devils and Moral Panics on the clashes
between the mods and rockers in England during the 1960s showed the power of negative
representation in amplifying disorder and bringing about a political crackdown on youth
(Cohen: 1973). Media often simplify and label activities of the young generation either as
"trouble" or "fun". News and documentary discourses normally emphasise the ugly
troubled side of young lifestyles. Cohen showed that riots on the beach between mods and
rockers hardly existed at all until the news media took up the issue. The same process
occurs in Malaysia, where newspaper coverage of youths is mostly based on their criminal
pursuits. In Malaysia, the ripple effects of the Prime Minister {New Straits Times.
5/3/1997, p. 7) mentioning the many social ills affecting the young were almost immediate
and led to a considerable amount of moral panic concerning Malaysian youth. For
example, "loafing", bohsia and bohjan were reported in news media, only representing
bad images of young people {The Star Online . 6/4/1997, p. 2).

In public social space, especially shopping malls, young people are liable to be seen
as a threat. The transformative power of media exaggeration and overstatement should
therefore be carefully monitored when dealing with such issues (Walton: 1993). Similarly,
Hall and others analysed the creation of the phenomenon of "mugging" and its association
with young people, in particular black British youth (Hall et al; 1978).

In Australia

researchers have looked at the role of the media in riots at the Bathurst motorcycle races
through their amplification of anti-police sentiment and limited portrayal of events
(Cunneen et al.: 1989).

Others have looked at media representations of bodgies and

widgies (Stratton: 1992) and contemporary youth subculture (Walton: 1993). A common
theme in all these studies is the way the young generation and their subcultures are
portrayed as deviant and criminal, with a corresponding emphasis on sexual behaviour and
violence.
Media images of youth crime can have a major impact on public policy depending
upon how politicians use and misuse the portrayals. From the point of view of social
control, media portrayals of certain types of youth subculture can produce "deviancy
amplification" (Cohen: 1973), that is, public labelling of particular groups of young people
which then generates fiirther deviant behaviour in the group so labelled.
In an examination of newspaper reporting of young people in Western Australia
between 1990 and 1992, Sercombe (1993, pp. 16-17) found that the major issue reported
in relation to young people was crime.

The study also found that two sources of

information (police and courts) dominated the news. Sercombe suggests that the reason
lies in the economics of news production and in the news values of the media. The media

are big business, and their representations need to be understood within the context of
profitability (what sells) and of discourses about social normality. In terms of production,
statements from courts and police are routine, cheap and easy to collect.

The close

connection between the police and journalists has been commented upon in a number of
Australian studies (Grabosky and Wilson: 1989; Cunneen et al: 1989). Even though there
are no Malaysian studies directly on this issue, it can be hypothesised that a similar pattern
will be found there, especially when youth problems come into focus.
The high rates of youth crime reported by official statistics and the media shape
perceptions of young people who are visible in the public domain. Media coverage of
apparent crime waves involving young people creates a particular kind of social
awareness, not only of the alleged offences, but of the kinds of young people most likely
to commit these offences. Invariably the focus of such media stories is on street crimes
(loitering, street fights, illegal motor racing, motor vehicle theft, etc.) and the main
message conveyed is of danger and the vulnerability of young people or the general public
to this kind of crime.
A consequence of this perceived threat posed by young people who are hanging
around shopping centres or in the streets is increased state intervention in the affairs of
young people as a matter of course.

This intervention into their lives combines with

difficulties of economic hardship, low self-esteem, few social resources and general
boredom associated with exclusion from the spheres of production and consumption to
make an explosive mix of desperation and anger. Young people can thus be caught up in
the web of no money, no job, no future and no power.

The exclusion of young people from the traditional means of income and social
status in the sphere of production (Cunneen et al.: 1989) has also altered their position in
the sphere of consumption. It is in this sphere of activity that young people are most
prevalent as offenders and are most likely to be identified as threats to existing economic
policy and institutions. The availability of paid work and disposable income leads led to
the construction of leisure activities that often target young people. As Stratton points
out, "with the advent of an increasingly consumption-oriented society independence came
to be measured more and more as a function of possible expenditure. This relates directly
to the rise of institutionalised and commercialised leisure activities" (1992, p. 163). The
position of young people as consumers also carries with it the tacit acceptance by
shopkeepers, business people and state officials of a new role for young people in society.
But if young people do not have the means or opportunity to play this role, yet still desire
to fulfil it, the resulting dilemma can lead to social tension.
Morality, or deviance ascription, enters into media constructions in two ways: (a)
the subject-matter may be unambiguously moral, that is, the person or behaviour being
discussed is either already widely praised and admired or condemned; or (b) methods of
presentation (vocabulary used, interpretation of the event, and the content in which it is
placed) cause almost any item of news to raise questions of morality (whether of a positive
or negative kind).
Among the codes and conventions which give form and structure to mass media
accounts of the life of young people are those which reduce difference to simple evil. The
media's force is all too often apparent in that it appears to speak from a supposedly

neutral position, while in fact its attraction and simplicity rest upon the crudest of
propositions. Jock Young (1971) has argued that the media are often in an unstated
reliance on the nemesis effect: that somehow any breach of norms, especially drug taking
or youthful deviance, will lead inevitably to a bad end. From the media's point of view the
image of youth is very selective, they are either saints or sinners. For the most part, the
young generation is only visible to society via the media when it poses a problem, when it
is trouble (Sercombe: 1993).
In Malaysia, the media portrayal of youth follows this pattern, and youths are
represented as wild and troubled. Youths are often blamed for generating the social decay
of the country. The most common images of youths in media are "ignoring the wrath of
God, killing, raping and bullying others, taking and selling drugs, prostituting, vandalising
property, indulging in 'mind less Western-inspired activities' and where possible, lounging
around without a care in the world" (New Straits Times: 5/3/1997, p. 6).

Besides

increasing the sale of newspapers, such negative images provoke broad social concerns
about the seriousness of the youth problem (New Straits Times: 5/3/1997, p. 6).

2.3 The focus on intervention
Social problems and their consequences for young people are causes for major
concern in government intervention and public discussion.

Yet we often find young

people's problems ascribed to a lack of particular personal attributes. There is a disturbing
silence about the changes that have fundamentally altered Malaysia's social and economic
structures and which have created a broad range of social problems for young people

(Ariffin: 1995, p. 344). The inadequacies and failings of the political and bureaucratic
systems are rarely discussed in public.
Not surprisingly, the individual as the focus for intervention produces pathological
interpretations of crime, resistance and other behaviours coming to the attention of social
control agents (Arififin: 1995, p. 344). Reasons for such behaviour are typically expressed
in terms of poor self-esteem, inadequate problem-solving or decision-making skills, and
being the victims of sexual or other forms of abuse. If the incidence of youth crime
increases, this can be attributed to "problem youth" and a whole series of "respectable
fears have been dealt with in this way" (Pearson: 1983, p. 229).
The focus on the individual as the problem distracts from any consideration of
structural causes.

For example, it can be argued that social settings may precipitate

deviant and criminal behaviour. Such settings can include group interaction in peer groups
and family relations, social institutions that fundamentally shape the relative power and
vulnerability of young people (such as the economy, education system and the labour
market), and structural orders of gender, social class and ethnicity (Coventry, Muncies and
Walters: 1992).
ArifFm claims that inequality, disadvantage and the powerlessness of young
Malaysians are created by structural forces, such as the rapid developments in
industrialisation and urbanisation which have created major changes in the institution of
the family and wealth distribution in urban areas in Malaysia (Ariffin: 1995). According to
this view, many of those caught up in state intervention programmes are in fact victims of
an injustice compounded by discretionary practices which tend to victimise young people.

Consequently, there are those who think that the practices of police, welfare, education
and community agencies that rely on coercion and the continued exclusion of young
people through processes of criminalisation will not address the problems faced by young
Malaysians {New Straits Times'. 6/3/1997, p. 13).
The search for other solutions continues. At the forefront of an alternative are
arguments regarding social justice, stressing that social development policies should be
based on the needs of young people. Changing society's institutions and practices that
generate injustice and inequality is seen as a way of producing a socially just society.
These kinds of interventions are expected to provide the means for enabling young people
to assume roles as fully integrated, financially secure and democratic participants in society
(Coventry: 1994).
Young people themselves are in a particularly disadvantaged position in terms of
having their own opinions or views on matters heard in the media. They have neither
official legitimacy, nor the institutional means of making their views known.
Finally, we need to consider how representations of young people coincide with
their position as a law-and-order problem within electoral politics. Virtually all political
parties in Malaysia now have law-and-order issues as a central component of their
electoral campaign.

In most elections, the extent of youth crime and appropriate

responses to it have been used as an electoral issue.

Often states in Malaysia have

attempted to outdo one another in order to be seen as the most punitive {New Straits
Times-. 25/2/1997, p. 7).

Youth crime in Malaysia is closely related to government's need to control the
lives of young people.

Moral panics over youth crime can be argued to arise from

distorted evidence that is highlighted by the media.

The goal of the Rakan Muda

programme is to reduce youth crime. However, it can also function as a government
control mechanism to intervene in the lives of young people in Malaysia, and moral panic
provides the rationale for this.
The data in this study aims to cover each of the following areas: how does the
Rakan Muda programme interpret youth crime and claim to help young people stay clear
of criminal activities? How does the media support or strengthen the government position
by depicting young people as the problem rather than as victims of crime? and how do the
operations of the Rakan Muda programme appear to young people involved in it?

2.4 Malaysian Development and Social Change
Since the early 1960s, Malaysia has recorded economic growth rates that have
consistently outperformed the average for all middle- and lower-middle-income countries.
Over the twenty-five years ending in 1980, real GDP increased at an average annual rate
of 7.4 per cent; in the decade 1980-90, the average was 5.2 per cent; and for the five
years, 1987-91, 8.3 per cent (World Bank: 1992, pp 23, 220-21).
Accompanying this growth has been a rapid change in the structure of the
Malaysian economy: agricultural commodities and minerals (mainly rubber and tin) have
declined in relative importance, being replaced by industrial goods (particularly electrical
goods and electronic manufactures) which accounted for an estimated 64 per cent of

exports in 1991 (Malaysia: 1991b: xv, 7-9). Malaysia's liberal policy towards foreign
investment has contributed to this growth in industrialisation.

To attract foreign

investment, tariff protection was increased for infant industries, tax concessions were
offered to encourage labour intensity and the use of domestic raw materials, location was
in accordance with government priorities and there were long-term goals for increasing
efficiency (Fisk and Osman-Rani: 1982, pp. 261-263). The increase of foreign investment
meant new demands for wage labourers. As a result, many new jobs became available for
Malaysians, especially for young men and women.
A significant characteristic of this process was the pace of technological change.
When technology came sporadically and spread slowly, human beings and their social
institutions had time to respond and adapt.

When the pace of technological change

increased beyond the capacity of human beings and their institutions to easily absorb and
adapt, then the likelihood of social disruption increased. The changes brought by modem
industriaUsation differed fi-om earlier changes in that the process was a conscious and
deliberate adoption and encouragement of change, and an attempt to increase its speed
(Briggs: 1983: p. 188).
What is now being seen in Malaysia, as in other developing countries, is the same
kind of disruptive social change as occurred in the industrialisation of current Organisation
of Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) societies. Industrial technology has
fiindamentally changed the patterns and ways of life in the OECD. Early industrialisation
was based largely on cheap supplies of poorly educated and unskilled workers.

The

structural social change that followed fi-om rapid application of new technology generated

factories and towns, uprooted village life and set masses of people adrift in a new, modern
world. The impact of technology on industry and employment was central to the social
changes of nineteenth century Europe and America, affecting where and how people lived.
Mass production demanded a work force concentrated in town and cities (Fisk: 1982, pp.
7-9).
In Malaysia, the impact of industrialisation can be seen in the important changes
affecting the rural/urban dichotomy. Urbanisation rapidly increased during the 1960s and
1970s, particularly in Peninsular Malaysia.

In the Peninsula, the urban population

increased from 2.5 million in 1970 to an estimated 4.1 million in 1980 (Fisk and OsmanRani: 1982, p. 10). This is a very large increase but perhaps even more important is the
ethnic and age composition of this population. Ethnic Malay urbanisation in the 1970s
proceeded more rapidly in Peninsular Malaysia than for other ethnic groups and a
significant proportion of recent Malay migration to the main cities has comprised young
single people seeking employment at low wages in unskilled factory jobs. Wages from
such employment are adequate for single unmarried life but not for establishing urban
families, whilst the prospects for advancement and for higher earning power for a large
number of those lower skilled workers are not immediately encouraging.

The new

structure of work in labour intensive industries demands single, unskilled, poorly educated
and submissive workers, preferably female employees (Hing: 1985a, pp. 153-155).
There is a large proportion of female workers in the manufacturing sector
especially in electronics, textiles and clothing (Hing: 1984; 1985a; 1985b). Most of the
workers are below 25 years old and have lower secondary or less education. With the

relatively high rate of increase in electronics and textile production, the number of female
workers has increased substantially. From the mid- 1980s to the 1990s, a substantial
portion of the new unskilled factory workers were Malays from rural areas, and as a result
there were labour shortages in many of their home areas (Halim: 1983, pp. 133-134).
The decline of agriculture in the 1980s, as cities expanded with the growth of
factory production and mechanisation, accelerated rural-urban migration. Rural families
were fragmented by this migration and inter-generational conflicts increased as young
people entered factory work. Many young people who moved into the cities stayed,
finding longer term work in expanding industries {New Straits Times: 13/2/1997, p. 7).
Ariffm (1981) points out that manufacturing has been one of the fastest growing
sectors in the Peninsular Malaysian economy. Utilising data from the 1976 labour survey
she shows that between 1957 and 1976 the employment in the manufacturing sector grew
dramatically by more than 320%. Most significant has been the increase in the female
labour force which saw the proportion in the manufacturing sector grow from 17% in
1957 to 41% in 1976.
In the context of Malaysian political economy this is a revolution of major
consequence, and is particularly well illustrated by the case of Penang state. Prior to 1969
Penang's economic survival had rested largely on its free port status and a variety of small
processing activities for rubber and tin. With the loss of free port status in that year the
State Government developed a bold policy of encouraging industrial activity in the State,
which led to the establishment of serviced industrial estates offering various kinds of tax
incentives and tariff protection for both import-substitution industry and the export of

manufactured goods. This policy has been remarkably successful (Penang Development
Corporation: 1980). The manufacturing sector's share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
increased from 21.0 per cent in 1971 to 37.2 per cent in 1980. This industrial growth
fuelled a considerable increase in per capita GDP which in 1971 was RM 1,035 but by
1980 had grown to RM 2,357. In addition, employment in the State's manufacturing
sector grew from 16 per cent in 1970 to 29.0 per cent in 1980.

Much of the

organisational basis for this growth was provided by the Penang Corporation as the
principle development agency of the State Government.
This growth was largely located in two types of industrial estates. In 1982 the first
type of industrial estates which were not Free Trade Zones employed 16,346 workers (30
% of the workforce), of whom 6,982 (42%) were females. The major types of industry in
these areas were food processing, chemical fertilisers, metal products and rubber-based
industries. Malays made up some 41% of the labour force in these industries (Penang
Development Corporation: 1982).
The second type of industrial estates were the Free Trade Zones (FTZs) of which
are in Penang State located at Prai, Prai Wrafl and Bayan Lepas. In 1982, Bayan Lepas
was by far the largest of these zones with 38 of the 50 factories employing 30,215 of
38,434 workers. In the FTZs there is a higher proportion of Malays (46 %). The two
major types of goods produced in these zones are electronics and textiles (Penang
Development Corporation: 1982).
Factories in these zones are foreign owned and belong to international companies
producing electronic circuitry in Japan and the USA, which are then sent to Penang for

assembly and testing before being utilised in computers, video games and other forms of
electronic gadgetry.
Kamal Salih (1982) gives important information on the characteristics of the labour
force employed in these factories. Some 83 per cent are between the ages of 16 and 27,
with 38 per cent in the age group between 20 and 23. The education levels are low, with
over 70 per cent only having completed three years of (lower) secondary schooling. There
is a high rural migrant component among these workers, with over 46 per cent coming
from nearby states.
Health surveys suggest that there is much greater incidence of intestinal and chest
illness among the workers in the factories than in the general population (Salih: 1982).
This is generally associated with the effects of fluctuating time shifts and air conditioning.
There are also said to be some problems of social adjustment among female workers who
are predominantly rural Malays.
Arififm (1992) examines factors that contribute to women's participation in the
work force.

She argues that there were three factors that led to the increase: (i) an

increased level of education for some women, changing their attitudes to work and
improving their employment prospects; (ii) rapid increase in demand for labour and
increased costs of living combine to attract other women, especially those from rural
areas; and (iii) the NEP, which sought to favour Malays by affirmative action quotas,
cannot reach its targets if only male workers are employed. Thus, job opportunities for
women in industry have increased more rapidly than for men, but in low waged job with
long hours, repetitive work and no upward mobility.

Ariffin also focuses on social problems faced by young people resulting from
industrialisation and urbanisation. Among the more obvious social changes are those
affecting the institution of the family, reflected in the statistics of rising divorce rates, later
marriages, deferred and smaller families, single-parents and "blended" families, in the
increase in pre- and extra-marital relationships and in social groupings which do not
conform to traditional family patterns (Ariffin: 1995: p. 348).
For young people and families, rapid change can bring tensions as tradition and
stability are eroded, and the consequent pressures can be bewildering and frightening.
There is no longer the security of long established customs and values nor any certainty of
future directions. The network of social support and services on which individuals have
long depended has itself been changing and has in many respects become more impersonal
and less adequate (Ariffin: 1995).

The support and concern provided by small and

relatively stable communities and by the extended family have either disappeared or are
diminishing.
Industrialisation and urbanisation also have effects on infrastructure (Ariffin:
1995). Even though there are many facilities such as shopping malls, movie theatres,
entertainment complexes and other public facilities, there are not many places for youth to
meet (such as community centres and sport arenas).

There are not enough facilities

available for youth to converge and work out excess energy. One question that arises
from this dearth of facilities is why youth should be penalised for hanging around shopping
malls when there are not enough places available for them to engage in lawful leisure
activities.

The increase of female, and particularly Malay female, participation in
manufacturing is a reflection of the role of government incentives and the expansion of
multinational industry. Another factor that should be emphasised is the operation of the
NEP. One part of that policy has been the enforcement of rules for new industries, which
ensure greater participation of Malays in the national economy. Most industrialisation
policy has been designed to implement the New Economic Policy (NEP) by using Malay
or MaXdcy/Bumiputra quotas for government employment, for education, and in the private
sector (Means: 1991, pp. 24-26). The NEP also involved a great increase in the formation
of quasi-public bodies and government agencies that were charged with providing special
assistance programme for Malays. Even though Malays were thus given a special position
in industrialisation pohcy and development, the government appears to have accepted no
responsibility for the resulting problems accompanying this rapid change.
While the majority of factories do recruit in urban areas there is also increasing
evidence that they recruit in rural areas and have greatly speeded up the rate and volume
of single Malay female emigration to urban areas (Hing: 1985, pp. 153-154; Ariffin: 1992,
p. 45). These labour-intensive industries prefer rural labour because it is easily attracted
by higher wages in manufacturing but is also seen as being more flexible and less
confrontational.

Secondly, they prefer female labour because women are paid lower

wages than men and because females are said to be more adept at intricate assembly
operations. They also prefer female workers because they can be easily dismissed and
learn skills more rapidly.

The manufacturing sector is still likely to be the fastest growing sector throughout
the 1990s. Given this, the role of training programmes such as Rakan Muda, which
involve the development of skills, technical knowledge and entrepreneurship, is likely to be
fiirther enhanced.

The Rakan Muda programme is part of numerous government

initiatives to train and prepare young men and women for the labour market. Even though
young people can gain other skills and knowledge from activities run by Rakan Muda, the
learning environment expects them to be submissive, loyal and disciplined individuals.
These qualities in individuals are very important when they enter job market, especially if
the jobs are in factory work where submissive, loyal and disciplined workers are clearly
preferred.

2.5 Sarawak development and social change
Sarawak is still a relatively frontier area. About 40 per cent of Malaysia's forests
are in Sarawak (Higgins: 1982, p. 180) and are expected to remain important sources of
employment and income. Mining, including offshore oil and gas, is on the verge of rapid
development. Development planning in Sarawak is largely a matter of land use planning
and is mostly based on forest resources.

Current development focuses on forest

industries, opening up new land for agriculture, and continued exploration and production
in the mining and energy sectors. There are also industries closely related to the primary
sector, such as processing forest products and producing fertilisers.
Sarawak is relatively behind in terms of economic development when compared to
the Peninsula, with "low levels of industrialisation, urbanisation, infrastructure and public

services with high levels of poverty and the dominance of the smallholding sectors in rural
areas" (King: 1990, p. 116). The major manufacturing industries in Sarawak are wood
products and food.

This concentration is due to a number of factors: insufficient

concentrated urban demand, low availability of tertiary industries, small numbers of trained
and trainable labour and lower levels of finance and agglomeration or "industry-attractsindustry" economies (Osman-Rani: 1982, p. 273).
The Malaysia Agreement of 1963 allows Sarawak control over education, land and
immigration (so that even Peninsular Malaysians enter Sarawak under strict control)
(Majid Cooke: 1997; King: 1990). However, development funds are controlled by the
federal government.

For a long time, Sarawak did not benefit from the fast paced

development in the Peninsula. While Sarawak is now catching up, local developments are
mostly centred in urban areas. According to King (1990: p. 116) "there has been some
development in Sarawak but in general, it has been localised and urban-centred and has
resulted in the emergence of large economic and political inequalities; to put it simply,
what one now has in Sarawak are the affluent urban alongside the rural poor".
The industrialisation and urbanisation now taking place in Sarawak have produced
the same problems faced by the Peninsula. In order to find a solution to these problems,
government policy in the Peninsula is often adopted in Sarawak regardless of the
differences in social development and historical conditions between the two regions.
There is often the assumption that the problems of young Malays in the Peninsula are also
those of young Malay Sarawakians.

A clear impact of development is the urban drift to the capital, Kuching {New
Straits Times: 13/2/1997, p. 7). However, there are some important differences between
Sarawak and the Peninsula. Unlike Peninsular Malaysia, there is a tendency in Sarawak to
underplay ethnic divisions. Ethnic composition in the state is much more complex than on
the Peninsula, where the main division is between Malays and non-Malays. In Sarawak
there are three broad categories which are internally sub-divided. First, the Malay-Muslim
category comprises Malays, Kedayan and a significant grouping of influential Muslim
Melanau. These together comprise less than 30 per cent of the estimated total population
of about 1.8 million in 1992 (Department of Statistics Malaysia: 1992). Secondly, there is
the category of non-Muslim natives, popularly known as the Dayak, made up mainly of
Iban (Sea Dayak) along with substantial numbers of Bidayuh (Land Dayak) and a host of
smaller groupings including Kayan, Kenyah, Kelabit and Penan.

The Dayak comprise

almost half of Sarawak's population, with the Iban alone consisting of over 30 per cent of
the total population and Bidayuh approximately 9 per cent. Thirdly, there are the nonnatives who comprise over 30 per cent of the state's population.

The overwhelming

majority of these are Chinese, with small numbers of Indians and Eurasians.

Given the

fact that Malays are not the majority in Kuching, there is less Malay influence in lifestyle,
culture, religion, belief and other social relationships. Thus, the Malays in Sarawak are
only one of several ethnic groups coming to terms with industrialisation and the changing
structure of Malaysian social life.
I now turn to look at how I sought to investigate and analyse the issues raised in
this chapter, by describing the methodology of my research.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Government Publications
This thesis rehes on three different data sets. The first is a review of materials on
the Rökan Muda programme published by the Ministry of Youth and Sport between 1994
and 1996. These materials include policy papers, documents and reports, handouts, interoffice memoranda, conference or seminar papers and written speeches given by the
Minister of Youth and Sport. The materials were published through both phases of the
Rökan Mudo programme.

The first phase started from the establishment of the

programme in 1994 until December 1995, while the second phase began on 1 February
1996 and is ongoing (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1996). The review of the government
materials on Rökan Muda is important for understanding the exercise of power, and the
parameters in which both government control and the contestation over the public
morality of young people have been fought.
Rökan Mudo has two major programmes (ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995):
Rökan Mudo Lifestyle (RML) and Rokon Mudo Brigade (RMB). RML is sub-divided
into nine activities: self-defence or martial arts, recreation, environmental caring
activities, sports, physical fitness, trade and apprenticeships, community welfare, cultural
activities and invention.

These activities emphasise the development of individual

motivation, initiative and skills in order to heighten the self-esteem of participants as well
as increase their self-reliance and assuredness.

Typically, considerable emphasis is

placed on "interpersonal growth" and development.

Each participant is expected to

develop good communication skills with others and gain skills from various activities

offered by the programme.

The values of individual endeavour, teamwork and

participation are viewed by the programme planners and practitioners as the qualities
required by young people to engage in active, co-operative and meaningful life in society.
Thus, directly or indirectly, these activities are expected to shape young attitudes and
values in specific ways (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995).
RMB focuses on different aspects of individual development, and has several
components (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995, 1996).

The first concentrates on

national fitness and services that aim to "better citizenship".

National fitness is

interpreted to mean the physical fitness and military preparedness of "soldier citizens" in
the even or war. The other components include leadership and skills training, especially
in business and entreprenuership. For the purpose of my thesis, I will focus more on the
RML because it has been more important in terms of implementation and participation,
and is now the only remaining programme.
The role of the Rakan Muda in the life of the young generation has generated
interest from some sections of the public, including academics {The Star Online.
6/4/1997; New Straits Times. 27/2/1997, p. 7; New Straits Times. 11/3/1997, p. 13). They
have raised questions about: (a) the effectiveness of youth policy in moulding the future
of the young generation; (b) whether the programme is simply a mean of controlling a
category of the young people who are relatively powerless but who are deemed
administratively manageable; (c) whether the programme has made a substantial
contribution to finding solutions to the perceived social and cultural problems of the
young or has merely assuaged the problem so that the government can concentrate on the

special needs of the elite and capitalists. All of these issues have been canvassed in
debates covered by the media.

3.2 Media Analysis
The second data set is therefore made up of newspaper coverage of "the youth
problem". The evaluation of this data does not involve content analysis but rather an
investigation of the rhetoric^ expressed by different groups, especially government
representatives, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and influential members of the
public such as academics and business elites. The newspaper analysis is based on four
Malaysian newspapers, the Berita Hartan, the New Straits Times, the Sarawak Tribune
and the Borneo Post. The analysis focuses on the creation of moral panic in relation to
youth crime, how young people are labeled as deviant and the amplification of youth
crime.
In Malaysia, even though newspapers are in private hands, their ownership is
closely affiliated with major political parties (Idid: 1989, p. 50). New Straits Times,
Utusan Malaysia, Berita Harian, Nanyang Siang Pau and Shin Min Daily News are
owned by investment arms of the ruling party, the United Malays National Organisation
(UMNO). Meanwhile The Star is owned by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)
and Tamil Nesan by the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), both in the governing
coalition. Simarly, the dominant government parties in Sarawak and Sabah also gained
effective ownership and control of all the principal daily newspapers. However, the press
in these two states is less strictly controlled (Crouch: 1996, p. 87). Newspapers owned by
different political groups are used to fiarther particular political interests especially during

election campaigns. In Sarawak, the Sarawak Tribune and Borneo Post are owned by
Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (United Bumiputera Heritage Party). The fact that "the
press was largely owned by groups associated with the government meant that news and
the commentary unfavourable to the government were rare and the activities of
opposition parties and government critics were normally presented in an unfavourable
light. But this did not mean that only a single point of view was expressed: although
uniformly pro-government, newspapers often represented different factions and interests"
(Crouch: 1996, pp. 86-7).
As in all countries, there are legal constraints on the print media. For example,
the Printing Presses and Publication Act (PPAPA) 1984 is designed to "regulate the use
of printing presses and the printing, importing, production, reproduction, publishing and
distribution of publications and for matters connected therewith" (Idid: 1989, p.47). This
Act regulates what might be acceptable and or not for publication and under this Act
publishers cannot operate without a license. This act was based on "the assumption that
the mass media must be organised and utilised as an instruments of leadership to achieve
national development goals and the ideals of the Rukunegara while avoiding any divisive
public controversies or inflaming communal passions over the sensitive issues" (Means:
1991, p. 138). The government did not exercise direct ownership. By a wide array of
legal penalties and through party ownership of much of the media, however, the
assumption was quite clear that all public media would be required to exercise restraint
and self-censorship.
There are 35 daily newspapers in Malaysia, 20 of which are published in
Mandarin, eight in English, three in Malay, three in Tamil and one in Malayalam. In

terms of sales, the combined circulation of the Utusan Malaysia and the Berita Harian
(the two biggest Malays language dailies) is about equal the total circulation of all the
Chinese newspapers, and they surpassed the combined circulation of the eight English
language dailies (Idid: 1989, p. 45).
In Malaysia there are four daily papers distributed nation-wide, namely the Berita
Harian, the Utusan Malaysia, the New Straits Times and The Star. For the purpose of my
research, I will concentrate on two of these major national newspapers: the New Straits
Times and the Berita Harian. The New Straits Times is subjected to more control than
the Berita Harian. As an English language daily, it serves a wider readership, especially
of the business community. The readership is made up of all ethnic groups: Malays,
Chinese, Indians, Native groups from Sarawak and Sabah and others (Idid: 1989, p. 42).
Even though both newspapers are owned by UMNO, they sometimes take different
stands on particular issues, especially at times of factional conflict within the party
(Crouch: 1996, p. 87).

Thus, it is useful to evaluate how these Malay-controlled

newspapers represent and cover the youth issues.
The New Straits Times and the Berita Harian are useful for an overall picture of
the origins, planning and implementation of youth policy Malaysia wide. However these
newspapers originate in Peninsular Malaysia, so they tend to under-emphasise, or at best
deal in a very perfunctory way, with Sarawak issues. For this reason I also cover two
local English language newspapers published in Sarawak.

These are the Sarawak

Tribune and the Borneo Post. Focusing on these local newspapers in a way to get an
insight into media coverage of the youth problem in Sarawak. Broader representation of
newspaper coverage would have been possible in larger and lengthier research, but my

research can usefiilly be seen as providing ways to approach other print media in
Malaysia.
The analysis of newspaper coverage was confined to the period after the 1995
election so that it would not be influenced by stories constructed with that election in
mind.

The period selected is between January 1996 and June 1997.

Some stories

presented in this period require linkage to press stories previous to 1996, and occasionally
reference is made to issues fi-om 1994 and 1995. The purpose of concentrating on the
newspaper coverage in 1996-1997 is to see the reactions of various groups to the issues
involved in the Rakan Muda program once it had been reasonably well established.
It became clear during the data gathering process that newspapers have become an
important arena for discussing the perceived social and cultural problems of the young
generation. It became equally clear that newspapers have become a mean for discussing
solutions and searching for a consensus on the perceived problems associated with the
young generation in Malaysia. Newspapers thus have become the mediators for the
public. Indeed it is now a practice in most newspapers in Malaysia to invite the public to
debate issues related to youth problems and their solution. Occasionally, young people
themselves are involved in these debates. For example, in letters to the editor columns,
individuals are encouraged to write about their opinions on youth issues and sometimes
the editor will set certain topics for the public to debate.
Four main aspects of the role of the newspapers will be explored: (a) which voices
are given an airing in the newspapers and to what extent young people are given a voice
about their problems; (b) what are the major social problems perceived to be associated
with the young generation; (c) what kinds of debates in newspapers are given priority by

the government in response to youth problems and why; and (d) in what way are the
debates linked to the fiinctioning of Rakan Muda as a government programme?

3.3 Opinions of Rakan Muda participations
The third body of data comprises interviews with 30 young people in Kuching,
the capital city of Sarawak. Kuching's development is still in its infancy compared to
Kuala Lumpur, where rapid development has taken place over a longer period of time. In
Kuching young people are less pressured by rapid development than in Kuala Lumpur.
However, Sarawak as a whole and Kuching in particular are experiencing newly found
wealth especially from timber (Majid-Cooke: 1997).

Material wealth and the

technological sophistication have posed new challenges to the people there, especially to
the young generation (Sarawak Tribune Online. 21/4/1997).
There are two reasons for the focus on ethnic Malay youth. First, although I am
the result of a union between an ethnic Chinese man a malay woman, I have been brought
up to be culturally Malay. The focus on Malay youth therefore makes capital of my
cultural background, prior knowledge of Malay society and the attendant ease of entry
into Malay youth groups. Without prior knowledge or links within Malay society, and
given the limited time available, access to "problem" youths in other ethnic groups could
not have been easily made.

Second, the Rakan Muda programme was adopted in

response to perceived problems resulting from changes taking place in Peninsular
Malaysia, especially among Malay communities there.

Because of Malay political

dominance, Malay problems are often given priority in the formulation of social policy.
However, as discussed in the literature review, Malays in Sarawak have a different

history from those of the Peninsula (King: 1988), and there is a tendency to underplay
ethnic divisions in the political sphere. Kuching therefore is a good place to study how
opinion is constructed in a location when Malay dominance is not take for granted, to see
whether national programmes are appropriate to local problems. Finally, there has no
such research carried out in Sarawak. Hopefully my contribution will act as a spur to
greater interest, at a stage in development when Sarawak might well still be able to avoid
the problems of the Peninsula.
The interview sample is made up of thirty young people, fifteen men and fifteen
women.

Of these, 26 respondents are Rakan Muda members while four are non-

members. There were introduced or made known to me by relatives and friends who are
members and staff of the Rakan Muda programme. The sample is therefore exploratory
rather than representative.
Individual interviews were used. Many interviews were conducted in the homes
of my respondents, generally in the family living areas where other members relaxed or
watched television.

I was very much regarded as a guest of the house and it was

therefore not considered polite for the host to leave me on my own. As the interviewing
went on, it usually became apparent that only the interviewee was needed and other
people could go on performing their household functions as usual.

However, some

parents or family members were curious and liked to know what sorts of questions were
being asked. Humorous interjections often took place and sometimes I could sense that I
was entertaining a group of people (family members and friends) who were curious and
keen to know the nature of my investigation. Views and comments made by other family
members have contributed to enrich the data because they helped to jog my respondents'

memories of past and key events in their lives. A semi-structured interview schedule was
used. There were certain standard questions, asked but respondents were encouraged to
respond freely, rather than make choices from a range of alternative responses. The
question (see Appendix) can be categorised as follows: (1) demographic characteristics,
namely sex, age, educational level, place of residence (town or village), employment and
family socio-economic status; (2) family background such as parents' employment,
marital status, house type and number of family members; and (3) participants'
experiences and opinions on youth problems and their solutions.
In asking about participants and their family backgrounds, I hoped to see whether
links could be made with participants' perceptions of youth problems. Some of the issues
explored were: (i) was there a relationship between youth crime and family background;
(ii) did male and female youths have different opinions on crime; and (iii) was there
different treatment of male and female problem youths by their family and the
programme?
Questions 11 to 20 invited participants to discuss or raise opinions on what the
government, media and elders in society perceived as youth problems or crime in the
context of modern industrialisation in Malaysia. These questions allowed participants to
talk about the social construction of youth problems and to investigate whether their own
perspective differed from privileged views and for what reasons they might be different.
Question 11 in particular asked participants to highlight their experiences in dealing with
the RakanMuda programme and their observations on the way it functioned.
Each interviewee was asked the same questions concerning his or her perception
of the young generation and its problems in modern Malaysia. Interviews ranged from

one and a half to two hours and were conducted in an informal manner. Tape recording
was not used as it was objected to by my respondents. Notes at interviews were written
up in detail as soon as possible after the interview. Nineteen of the 30 interviews were
conducted in the interviewees' homes, five were conducted at Kentucky Fried Chicken
outlets (a popular place for young people to be seen) and six interviews were conducted
at my home. The questionnaires were in standard Malay. The interviewing was mostly
conducted in Malay, using local dialect only when I detected any problem in speaking
standard Malay.
Finally, one possible reason for my being welcomed in most homes was that
parents very much welcomed my study. They hoped that it would highlight the problems
their children were facing and that changes would take place to help protect their children
against the social and cultural problems reported by officials.
The interview data were first examined separately to identify opinions in support
of or against Rakan Muda as a crime prevention mechanism. Then each question was
listed and grouped according to two issues: (i) whether Rakan Muda is geared towards
reducing the level of youth crime; and (ii) how Rakan Muda sought to develop attitudes
in youth that would encourage them to stay clear from criminal involvement. Since time
constraints on my research meant that the sample was not a statistically representative
one, the results aimed only to seek the opinions of members within Rakan Muda and
should not be seen as applying to the youth population at large.
The purpose of these interviews was to try and elicit information from members,
to see what "insiders" have to say about the operations of Rakan Muda programmes and
whether these programmes gave them a sense of participation and helped then in facing

and solving their problems. I have assumed that these people were admitted to the
programme because they were perceived as "problem" youth.
The three data sets allowed an understanding of the total of the broad processes
which have shaped debates over youth problems in Malaysia, and how those debates have
become institutionalised. The data allowed an exploration of the ways in which formal
politico-legal institutions of the state, the corporate organisations of the media and the
social relations of young people in the context of a modernising industrial nation were
related and influenced the generation of moral panic about the youth crime issue.
Both government and newspaper materials were subject to review analysis. The
government data was used to look at Rakan Muda programmes and how the authorities
perceived and reacted to young people's problems through the implementation of these
programmes. Focus is placed on the elements of social control highlighted in Chapter 2.
The newspaper analysis covered not only authorities' opinions but also those of private
organisations, the general public and young people and concentrates on the ways in
which moral panic is created about the activities of young people. The third data set
specifically targets young people involved in the Rakan Muda programme. The intention
is to gather insider feedback about Rakan Muda programmes and how and whether these
programmes can help members to stay clear of crime. More broadly the data looks at the
dilemmas faced by young people in the context of industrialisation in Malaysia. Through
these three data sets I have attempted to articulate the dynamics of the construction of the
debates about the youth problem in Malaysia, with a particular focus on youth crime.
However, I have also indicated the limitations in this study. There is clearly a
need for more comprehensive surveys of Malays youths outside the Rakan Muda

programme, as well as scope for comparative material from other ethnic groups. My
thesis should therefore be seen as opening an area for research where far too little has yet
been done. I now turn to look at the government construction of the "youth problem" and
its response.

^ Rhetoric is conventionally defined as the study of persuasion. Aristotle defined rhetoric as: "the faculty
of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not the function of any other art.
Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine
about what is healthy and unhealthy... But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of
persuasion on ahnost any subject presented to us". (McKeon, 1941, p. 1329)

CHAPTER 4
4.0 The Rakan Muda crime prevention programme for the young "at risk"
generation: between care and control
As discussed in the introductory chapter, Rakan Muda had two component
programmes, the Rakan Muda Lifestyle (RML) and the Rakan Muda Brigade (RMB).
The focus of this chapter is mainly on the crime prevention component of the RML,
although a brief account of RMB is also provided in order to clarify the relationship
between the two. I begin by locating the programme within emergent crime prevention
arguments, suggesting that they are part of a broader shift in how youth crime is
constructed and addressed in Malaysia. The key feature of these changes is the resurgence
of the "emphasis on individual responsibility over governmental action" (Weir: 1993, p.
93) and greater involvement of community agencies and groups (NGOs, social services,
academics, business leaders) in programme implementation.

I argue that the different

programme components contain problematic assumptions about youth crime and young
people's behaviour. Furthermore, despite the scale of the programmes in terms of both
funding and participation, very little analysis of their effectiveness has been undertaken
(Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1996).
Finally, I argue that there is some cause for concern about the operation of the
programmes and the assumptions they make.

They contain some features which are

innovative, perhaps worthwhile, and which can be considered complementary to other
services currently on offer for young people in Malaysia. But the question is whether this
characterisation generally holds true or whether there are other aspects of the programmes

which might be negative as they search for a means to help young people turn away from
"at risk" behaviour.

4.1 The Ideology of Crime Prevention
In his seminal work, Visions of Social Control, Stanley Cohen wrote of a
benevolent creeping process, based on incremental eligibility, that expands the property of
the criminal justice system to welfare and treatment agencies. He argued that:
The ideology of early intervention and treatment and the use of psychological or
social work selection criteria, allows diversion to be incorporated into wider
preventive strategies. Legal definitions and due process give way to low visibility,
"discretionary decision-making" by administrative or professional agencies. The
drift is to work with parts of the population not previously reached, variously
defined as young people "in trouble", "at risk" or in "legal jeopardy", "predelinquents" or "potential delinquents".
(Cohen: 1985, p. 33)
Cohen's argument can be applied to the proliferation of crime prevention policies
and programmes in Malaysia (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1994,1995 and 1996). It is a
process which potentially undermines the principle of diversionary strategies (reduction of
labelling, stigma and a lessened focus on individual treatment), instead allowing for earlier
intervention, extension into new populations and the creation of new agencies.
Crime prevention is not a new thing in Malaysia. Sutton (1994: pp. 216-219) in
his article "Community Crime Prevention: A National Perspective" summarised the three
categories of crime prevention: situational, social and developmental. Situational
prevention is a focus on changing physical environments in order to increase the efforts
and risks or reduce the rewards for crime (Clarke: 1992). Usually this type of prevention
is designed for specific problems. The most common methods are target hardening, target
removal and taking away the means for crime by increasing surveillance.

Meanwhile the social prevention covers all attempts to reduce offending by
changing the patterns of behaviours, the values and the self-discipline of groups seen as
most likely to be drawn into crime. Usually it required town and municipal committees to
develop co-ordinated plans to ensure that young people in danger of being pushed to the
margins of society became involved in employment, education, vocational training,
cultural and recreational activities.
Developmental prevention concentrates on providing voluntary support and
assistance to families having children exposed to a high risk of crime involvement. Such
prevention includes "early family intervention programmes".
Looking at the government data and policies on this issue, it is clear that Malaysia
adopted the social prevention perspective especially when dealing with young people. In
order to prevent young people from getting involved in or exposed to crime and deviance
activities, authorities in Malaysia outlined and implemented many youth programmes
designed directly for this purpose. Among the many programmes is the Rakan Muda
programme where young people are expected to join a range of activities. The intention is
to provide young people with as many activities as possible so that they have less time for
leisure pursuits. Rakan Muda programme offers activities focused on knowledge and skills
either in employment, education, vocational training, cultural and recreational activities.
Rakan Muda can clearly be seen as part of Cohen's "creeping process". Young
people who are considered to be "at risk" by government are encouraged to participate in
Rakan Muda programmes. Participants are in turn generally perceived by Ministry and
programme supervisors as people in need of treatment or early intervention. The spread

of this form of community correction is so pervasive as to make most young people a
potential target of intervention and treatment.
The second concern of this chapter is the response of young people to these new
forms of treatment and control, and the ways in which they negotiate their way through
their inclusion in the "at-risk-in-need-of-treatment" category. My argument is that such
development needs to be firmly located within a broad socio-political context.

In

Malaysia, particular attention needs to be given to developments in youth programmes and
the definition of "youth". Rakan Muda uses two crime prevention strategies: a push
towards community policing and community crime prevention on the one hand, and a
focus on private and public inter-agency co-operation on the other. Community policing
represents the co-operation between members of a certain community whereas private and
public inter-agency co-operation deals with links between private agencies, government
representatives and the public.

Each of these emergent trends suggests that the debates

over welfare versus justice models for juvenile justice have been superseded by a process
of simultaneous broadening of welfare concerns and promulgation of the ideology of the
justice model. Young people are seen as being in need of guidance and assistance (the
welfare aspect), whilst at the same time offending is seen to be the result of calculated
decisions by rational actors (the justice aspect) (Naffine and Wundersitz: 1994). Young
people in Malaysia experience this ambivalence in the treatment they receive fi-om
authorities and society more widely. They are not only treated as subordinate to adults
and in need of direct adult supervision, but at the same time they are held to be personally
responsible for their deviant misconduct.

Government intervention depicts them as a

problem rather than as victims, in turn justifying the authorities intervening and controlling

their actions when they are perceived to be outside adult supervision. The argument for
intervention and control is that young people in Malaysia are in need of protection from
themselves, peer groups, devious adults and various temptations of modern social and
urban life (Ariffin: 1995).
Rakan Muda had the specific aim of bringing older people and youths together in
the belief that this would have a positive impact on reducing youth crime. Furthermore,
by involving not only Ministry representatives but society in general, the programme is
seen to meet wider demands for community crime prevention, where the community must
work in concert with the government and law and order agencies to control and prevent
crime, working "together against crime" {New Straits Times-. 27/2/1997, p. 1).
The participation of agencies outside government in crime prevention characterises
the broader shift in social policy in which young people are subject to ever increasing
intervention and control.

As part of the dual concern for economic efficiency and

enhanced co-ordinated responses, the multi-agency approach has been signalled as the
means towards new and improved service delivery. The government seeks to coordinate
differential participation by various groups in society into an integral network.

For

example, the police and youth leaders played an increasingly important role in schools by
attempting to educate students about the meaning and merits of good citizenship.
The Ministry for its part organised Rakan Muda councils and regional committees.
Representatives come from both state branches of the Ministry of Youth and Sport and
panels appointed by the Prime Minister. All committees meet periodically to identify ways
in which the local community can play a part in crime prevention, with a focus on keeping
young people out of crime. This new type of broad intervention seeks to enlist every

community resource in a proactive and co-ordinated effort to contain and prevent crime,
giving particular attention to improving the relationship between older people and youth.
Concern about the nature of the relationship between law and order agencies and
young people is connected to broader perceptions of youth deviance. In an overview of
police practice in Australia, Steven Jones and Kenneth Polk have argued that the policing
of young people is a major contributor to social disorder; that young people are becoming
increasingly lawless or problematic because of drug-taking and a lack of respect for
authority; and that young people are particularly vulnerable to sexual and physical abuse
(James and Polk: 1989). Chandra MuzafFar {New Straits Times'. 27/2/1997, p. 8), Harun
Hassim {New Straits Times. 6/3/1997) and Yuen-Li {The Star Online. 6/4/97) argue that
in Malaysia young people are treated as if they are the root of all social disorders. They
question the mainstream treatment of young people, especially when authorities place too
much emphasis on control strategies, such as the need to set a curfew time. At the same
time as authorities blame youths for the increased incidence of drug addiction in the
country, they fail to explain why this increase has occurred despite severe penalties applied
to drug offenders. They also argue that the issues of lepak, bohsia, sexual and physical
abuse and abandonment of babies are not entirely youth problems. Thus, for such issues
to be dealt with effectively, much data has to be gathered and greater research done. This
is true, but even if the police, welfare departments, the probation office and voluntary
organisations provide more statistics and related information, we still lack data that
represent the views of young people themselves.
The government's intense preoccupation with youth and social order might have
ideological appeal but is difficult to support factually. The government's perception that

youths are a serious threat to social order is largely driven by media discourse. Yet on the
government's ov^n statistics, young people are generally under-represented in serious
violent crimes and are more likely to commit property crimes such as burglary, theft and
stealing motor vehicles. White (1990) argues that the relationship between law and order
agencies and young people is often characterised to a high degree by confrontation and
contestation over what constitutes troublesome behaviour, particularly in public spaces,
and I would argue that this also applies to young people in Malaysia. For example, loafing
among youths in Malaysia is perceived to be a serious problem by authorities while some
young people do not see this as a problem at all. Young people argue that authorities
always see them as a threat to society and almost every move they make is questioned or
checked, in case it might lead to trouble. This breakdown in communication then leads to
conflict between young people and the authorities. In order to improve this relationship, it
is important for the authorities to understand and give young people a chance to share
their views and experiences. The specific goals of programmes such as Rakan Muda must
therefore be considered in the light of this broader agenda of youth policy in Malaysia and
its relation to law and order in particular.

4.2 Rakan Muda: RML and RMB
Funded in 1994 by the government, Rakan Muda was established largely at the
urging of the Ministry of Youth and Sport, which was responding to the alarming rate of
youth crimes reported by police statistic and the media. Its study of young people in 1995
led to a belief that many were experiencing emotional problems and that drug use and drug
dealing were particular problems among the young. For example, the statistics for new

drug addicts in the Malaysia showed annual increases and the same applied to repeat
offenders despite severe penalties (Anti Drug Unit: 1993). Committee representatives
from every state in Malaysia were brought together to discuss ways of addressing these
issues, and a programme developed in consultation with the Ministry of Youth and Sport.
Rakan Muda aimed to address the perceived related issues of drug abuse, family
breakdown, sexual assault and "at risk" lifestyles.

Since then, the organisation has

expanded and developed into a national enterprise involving dozens of staff and thousands
of youth participants. Over the past three years, an estimated 1,207, 352 young people
have taken part in the programmes across Malaysia (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1997).
Rakan Muda programmes are managed and administered by the Ministry of Youth
and Sport and the philosophy and techniques used in both programmes are the same, with
the most obvious difference being the Hmited number of participants in RMB, which deals
only with nationality, individuality and citizenship. My research focuses predominantly on
RML, which mainly targets young people's lifestyle.
RML shares the same broad objectives and strategies as RMB but was designed to
assist young people who were having difficulties coping with the pressures of modern life
and young people who were on a path leading to crime. It sought to help young people
face emotional issues associated with family breakdown, drug abuse, sexual assault, sexual
relationships, self-esteem and other social problems. RML sought to do this in a proactive way by giving participants the opportunity to develop self-reliance, trust,
responsibility, self-discipline and relationship skills (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995).

RML combines recreational activities with trust-building exercises, focused group
discussions, teamwork to build self-esteem and confidence and to help young people deal
with personal and social problems that they experience in their lives.
The programme facilitators, notably representatives fi-om the Ministry of Youth
and Sport or Rakan Muda staff, consistently claim the crime prevention potential of these
programmes and their ability to "touch lives". They argued programme activities will
prepare and equip young people to face challenges in their lives (Ministry of Youth and
Sport: 1995). However, increasingly a majority of academics and sections of the public
have exhibited sceptical and negative attitudes towards Rakan Muda programmes (see
New Straits Times: 27/2/1997, p. 7; New Straits Times: 6/3/1997, p. 13 and New Straits
Times: 11/3/1997, p. 13). In their view, the various interactive activities have failed to
break down the barriers between older people and youths in their daily lives, meaning that
some young people would simply revert back to their old ways shortly after leaving the
programmes {New Straits Times: 27/2/1997, p. 7).
Rakan Muda emphasises the importance of having young people play a role in the
operation of the programmes, so young people are divided into youth leaders, trainee
youth leaders and general participants. Youth leaders are people who have been identified
by programme facilitators as having the capacity and desire to perform a leadership
function. Criteria for being a youth leader are that participants should be aged between 18
and 25 years and in good physical and mental health. The leaders should also have no
current drug or alcohol-related problems nor a history of violence (Ministry of Youth and
Sport: 1995). Once identified, they are then offered a trainee leadership programme and

at times perform some of the tasks of leaders at general programmes prior to becoming a
fully-fledged leader.
There are several purposes to this hierarchy. Most importantly the youth leaders
perform a number of key functions in the programmes, from conducting roll calls at the
beginning of each activity through to facilitating group activities. Even something as
minor as ensuring an orderly time schedule for each programme activity is seen as part of
this process of devolving responsibility. Rakan Muda organisers are aware of the need to
involve young people in organising and administering the programmes, so as to lessen the
appearance of adult control. This can also allow a vitality in the programme and generate
a feeling among young participants of relative autonomy and freedom.
There are, however, limits to such autonomy since many of the organisers running
the programmes are concerned to create a degree of uniformity in all Rakan Muda
programmes that they run across the country. Some organisers exert a degree of influence
greater than their formal role might indicate, so the emphasis on empowering young
people has to some extent been countered by the continual intrusion of organisers into the
processes of decision-making and organisation.
This can also be a problem with some of the youth leaders and trainee leaders
themselves, so it would be misleading to view the disciplinary regime of the programmes
simply as a reflection of the unequal relationship between submissive youth and powerful
adults. Rather the programmes provide an environment of contestation involving mixed
and competing goals and processes.
Although young people identify factors such as violence, sexual abuse and a lack
of general parental care as contributing to their problems, this does not necessarily lead to

a questioning by authorities of how they live. Attempts were made by the authorities to
construct actions of responsibility that placed central importance on young people
identifying the need to change their own ways. It is clear from this action that the
authorities tended to assume young people were the problem rather than victims.
Certainly the accounts of young people themselves suggest that while the regime in the
programmes encourages them to consider their often troubled lives, it is left up to
themselves to change their behaviour.
The programmes utilise a number of group techniques. Recreation, discipline,
relaxation, cultural activities, physical fitness and focus group workshops are presented in
various forms throughout the duration of each programme. Participation in all programme
activities is open to both RML and RMB members and the "team work" concept,
reiterated throughout the programme, is central. By focussing on specific relevant issues
such as drug abuse, sexual practices and teen pregnancy, the programmes allow young
people to openly discuss and share personal experiences and opinions with the entire
group.
The supporting literature for Rakan Muda suggests that several benefits emanate
from the programmes (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1996). For the young people who
participate, there is an expectation that they will improve their self-esteem, increase
independence, have positive informed views of the need for education and training, and
potentially develop better relations with society, government, and law and order agencies.
However, what is not clear from the literature is whether the young people really have
much of a say in constructing the way they live, or whether they simply choose to think
and react according to what they see is desired and accepted by the authorities.

4.3 Promoting enhanced community participation in crime prevention
The government also takes on the responsibility of managing the cultural and
social environments of young people through the Ministry of Youth and Sport. Rakan
Muda is one of many such programmes since issues to do with young people came into
focus in the late 1980s as a result of the economic downturn at that time, the first major
economic setback in Malaysia's industrialisation process.

When the pace of

industriaUsation failed to match the rate of urbanisation, the government saw the need to
address the problems associated with rural migrants (mainly Malay youths) who became
young urban dwellers.
In the debates that have ensued since 1994, two major questions have been raised.
The first is whether the adoption and implementation of the Rakan Muda programme is
effective in moulding the future of young people in preparing them for new job markets
and the social expectations of industrial society. The second is whether the programme
simply targets youths who have little or no power to resist, letting those in power
determine how they should live and behave.
According to the Rakan Muda reports, one of the major problems that affects
young people in Malaysia is not having enough to do in their leisure time. The 1994
report (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1994) stated that being directionless, these young
people tend to hang around public places such as shopping complexes and that this new
trend has become a major problem for crime and justice policy in Malaysia. Government
and non-government organisations have expressed their own special interests and concerns
about this problem, both at the discourse and policy levels. There is, of course, nothing
wrong with the government or other social groups being concerned with the youth

problem. However, if the perceived reason for these young people hanging out is their
being directionless and having nothing to do, to what extent is this problem generated by
the government or community groups not providmg enough facilities and activities for
them? It can also be questioned whether hanging around a shopping centre is a problem at
all, unless violence or property damage is involved. There is no strong evidence provided
by the Ministry to support the view that hanging out leads young people to become
criminals.
The government thinks that the social and cultural problems of young people have
to be tackled from different avenues and perspectives (Ministry of Youth and Sport:
1994). The major problems outlined by the Ministry of Youth and Sport cover a very
wide range, as do the strategies that the Ministry thinks can prevent these problems from
becoming worse.
Drug use is a central problem. Statistics on drug abuse show an increasing trend
(Figure 1). Approximately 76,760 drug addicts were known from 1990 to 1993 alone,
comprismg 16,956 cases in 1990, 19,055 cases in 1991, 20,236 cases in 1992 and 24, 023
cases in 1993.

Figure 1 shows the same increases for both new users and repeat

offenders, despite the government's tough laws against drug use.

Figure 1: Drug Abuse Cases
(1990-1993)
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Source: Anti Drug Unit, (1993)

Yet despite this increasing trend in drug addiction, few attempts have been made
or studies done to determine whether drug problems are particularly a youth problem, and
if so, what can be done in order to overcome this problem. The central question is why,
despite severe penalties, drug addiction is still on the increase. Why was there also an
increase in repeat cases? The increases could also imply that it is easy to obtain drugs, and
the persistence of repeat offenders raises questions about the effectiveness of drug
punishments and rehabilitation programmes in the country.
Second, young people aged between 15 and 39 are found to be involved in major
offences such as homicide or attempted homicide, armed robbery (either individually or in
gangs), rape and physical assault. Figure 2 shows this trend.

Figure 2: Youth crime and delinquency (1990-1993)
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Young people were involved in 46 cases of homicide or attempted homicide, 150
cases of robbery, 111 cases of rape and 468 cases of physical assault from 1990 to 1993.
The problem with this statistic is the classification of "youth". If the age group is reduced
to those between 15 and 21 the trend could appear to be very different.

Why are

individuals aged 26 to 39 still being classified as young people when in all other regards
they are considered to be adults? Is this simply government manipulation of data to
excuse its control and intervention in the lives of young people?

If so, fears about

perceived escalating youth crime are not realistic. If the government wants to focus on
young people, it needs to explain how it defines the "youth" category.
Third, the Ministry argued that among primary and secondary school students in
1993 there were 172,615 (4.1% of the total of 4,207,381 students) with discipline
problems (Table 3.1, below).

Table 1: Classification of deviant acts committed by students in 1993

Type of deviant
behaviours
Crime
Obsence acts
Tidiness
Punctuality
Irrespectable
Vandalism
Dishonest
Truant
Others
Total

Primary School

%

Secondary School

%

11,522
1,338
3,157
3,484
8,410
2,392
825
8,490
2,797
42,415

0.34
0.05
0.12
0.13
0.31
0.09
0.03
0.31
0.10
1.56

15,543
3,172
15,025
17,379
21,713
2,299
1,781
45,336
7,952
130,200

1.04
0.21
1.00
1.16
1.45
0.15
0.12
3.02
0.53
8.68

Source: Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 1993

This statistic hides a very big difference between primary and secondary pupils,
and seeks to disguise the difference in criminal involvement them. A study by the Ministry
of Education in 1992 (Ministry of Education: 1993) found that there are about 155,998
major discipline cases due to student misbehaviour per year. 23,613 of these resulted
from family background such as broken marriage, neglective or abusive parents. 7,081
cases were caused by the learning environment (such as a school curriculum that is too
demanding) and peer pressure (students influenced by friends to try smoking, take drugs
or become involved in gang fights).
These figures fail to distinguish in their classifications of discipline problems
between a broad range of behaviours such as delinquency, erotic misconduct, dishonesty
or untidiness. The classifications are not clear. Can untidiness, dishonesty or even erotic
misbehaviour be considered on a par with property damage or assault? This failure to
make clear distinctions in behaviour aids the "benevolent creeping process" identified by

Cohen (1985) because it blurs the lines between minor and serious offences and makes
youth problems appear far worse than they actually are.
Fourth, a report of the Ministry of National and Community Development (1993)
found that there were 711 cases of rape in 1992. More than half (55.6%) of the victims
were youths under the age of 16. In 1993, 465 victims (55.9% of 879 cases) were youths
under the age of 16. This report however, only informed us about the victims of rape.
There was no indication of who the offenders were, so it is not clear if most, or any, of the
offenders were young people. What is clear is that youths are the victims. Are the
perpetrators of this crime mostly adults? We cannot say, and therefore cannot fully
appreciate the nature of this being a youth problem as opposed to a more general issue of
crime. Before the government constructs this problem as a youth problem, it is essential
to gather more convincing data on offenders.
Fifth, the Ministry recognises a religious problem which is focused on Muslim
youths. The recently widespread teachings of new Islamic groups in Malaysia with
different and often extreme beliefs do attract many young people seeking new identities or
security in the fast changes of modem life. Young Muslims are the most vulnerable,
especially if they come from a weak religious background where parents do not bother to
teach then- children or practise the teachings of religion themselves. According to the
Department of Islamic Teaching (1993), the extreme movements, actions and beliefs of the
new fundamentalist groups deviate from the true teaching of Islam, so the religious
establishment sees this as a threat to the new generation of young Muslims. The false
teachings of new groups might cause conflict not only among Muslims themselves but also
between them and non-Muslims in Malaysia's multi-religious society. But it is not clear to

what extent such false teachings are connected to youth problems. In Malaysia, freedom
of religion is guaranteed in the Constitution. What is clear is that the teachings labelled as
false threaten the mainstream position because they represent the views of groups that
oppose government poUcies.

Thus in order not to lose potential supporters of the

government to newly emerging groups, their religious conduct is classified as deviant and
young people involved in them as having problems requiring government intervention.
Sixth, transvestite (pondan), gay, lesbian and both hohjan and bohsia (see Chapter
1, n. 1) activities become a concern because they are seen by the government as
contradicting the values and norms of Malaysian society. The Ministry therefore sees a
need to pay serious attention to them. For example, in Kuala Lumpur gay groups who
have been classified by the Ministry as professionals fi'om elite backgrounds practice
homosexuality and bisexuality (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995: p. 15). Government
officers and public representatives see this as a threat to society because if no immediate
action or prevention is taken, it will put youths at great risk, especially when various
sexually transmitted diseases are threatening the well-being of Malaysian society. Gays
have a high risk of being affected by fflV/AIDs and sexually transmitted diseases.
Transvestites also face the same risk. A study done by the Department of Social Welfare
in 1989 (Department of Social Welfare: 1993) reported that in Kuala Lumpur alone there
were approximately 6,000 transvestites. Department said that these people are usually
involved in prostitution or illegal marriage with a same sex partner, and are said to have a
high risk of getting HIV and AIDS resulted from unsafe sexual practices. The other
groups which are considered at risk are hohjan and bohsia, people with multiple sexual
partners who are sexually active before marriage. Their lifestyle is classified as a "free

sex" lifestyle where they often change sexual partners. Due to their tendency of avoiding
safe sex and of having multiple partners, these people have a greater risk of being affected
by dangerous sexually transmitted diseases such as herpes, HIV and AIDS. The Ministry
suggests that all of these groups' lifestyles threaten not only themselves but also the
wellbeing of the Malaysian population. Their lifestyle may retard the development of the
country especially when they are seen as the generation to mould and build the future of
Malaysia.
Even though the problem of sexual deviance is concerned with the statistical
incidence of specific sexual practices, it is more closely involved with policing the
boundary lines of the heterosexual norm. Bohsia, bohjan, transvestite and homosexual
groups have been classified as sexually deviant. A moral panic of epidemic proportions
resonated throughout Malaysia, the popular media and amongst health care professionals
and policy-makers around AIDS and HIV {New Straits Times. Sl'^ 11991, p. 6). Much of
this panic focused on sexual practices and sexualities, especially those of young people,
gay men and women, all of whom were represented in different ways as promiscuous and
sexually deviant. The panic around AIDS and HiV was a panic over deviant sexualities in
which "perverted" youth formed an automatic constituency for adult concern through the
sexualised construction of young people {New Straits Times-. 5/3/1997, p. 6). In practice
Malaysians, in particular Malay Muslims, are prohibited fi-om any sexual misconduct
before marriage. Youths thus, receive more attention and stigmatisation because of their
unmarried status, which can place them under adult supervision and responsibility. They
are considered to lack a sense of judgement, especially when their sexual practices can risk
the danger of sexually transmitted diseases. Clearly the explanation for the intervention in

the sexual practices of young Malay people is based on Islamic principles, but this ignores
the needs of other youths from different ethnic backgrounds. While the law on sexual
misconduct is very strict, sex education is very limited in Malaysia, especially for the
young. In fact sex education is still a taboo subject for most Malaysians and sex is not a
topic to be discussed in public. In most cases it is hardly even discussed at home.
Seventh, the Ministry is concerned about the incidence of abandoned babies.
There were about 18 cases of abandoned babies in 1988. In 1993 the number of cases had
increased to 56.

Of these, 35 involved Malays, 16 Indians and 4 Chinese.

All were

associated with young people. The core of the panic about abandoned babies is related to
premarital heterosexuality, especially amongst young working-class women who work in
factories in urban areas. This can be seen in fears over teenage pregnancy which is usually
represented as a consequence of uncontrolled youthful sexuality. Young women have
provided the chief focus for the authorities' anxiety partly because they have the babies
(and abandon them) and at the same time threaten the patriarchal control of female
sexuality and fertility. Why have some young people abandoned their babies? In Malaysia
the marriage law and many in society do not allow single unmarried women to have
children. The law thus left them with too little ahernative. A single young woman with an
unwanted pregnancy may find it is hard to face both the law and society. As a result, she
might choose to abandon her baby instead of caring for it. Malaysian society is still very
conservative with regard to this matter, but logically the abandoning of babies cannot be
solved unless single parents are recognised by the law and society in Malaysia.
Eighth, between 1st - 14th February 1994, researchers from seven Malaysian
universities conducted a study of young people found loitering in public places in major

cities throughout Malaysia. The report, entitled '"The Loafing Behaviour

Among

Teenagers'' (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1994) was based on a survey in Peninsular
Malaysia of 6,110 young people between 12 and 25 years of age.

One of the main

findings in this report was that on average, young people spend approximately 16.3 hours
per week hanging out in public places, or about 847.6 hours per year. Loafing is prevalent
among all ethnic groups but is more widespread among Malay youths, who loaf 16.8
hours a week compared to 14.7 hours by Chinese and 12.8 hours by Indians. Loafing is a
problem in almost all major urban areas in the Peninsula.
free time increased fi^om 14.4 hours to 18.8 hours.

As age increased, unstructured
Respondents who had low

performance in school or work had the most fi'ee time (26.3 hours per week).
The report shows that those young people with the most fi"ee time had less
inspiration and motivation in life, were deemed to be selfish and less sensitive to others'
well-being, were less motivated to work hard or improve their condition and had very little
idea of how to spend their fi-ee time. Those who spent most time in public places came
fi-om a poor socio-economic background, with about 58% of the respondents coming fi-om
families with an income of 700 Malaysian Ringgit or less a month. Those with the most
unstructured fi-ee time were more interested in the various types of entertainment available
in the market. Hanging out (lepak) in public places is viewed by the authorities as a
worrying trend among young people in all the major cities in Malaysia as these young
people had very poor skills in how to improve their self-image and their social and
economic well-being. One reason for government concern is of the lost of potential
workers in the process of industrialisation. If young people choose to loaf rather than to
prepare themselves for the job market, then the government's Vision 2020 goal cannot be

achieved. Another reason is due to the hectic and packed urbanisation in all major cities in
Malaysia that ignores the needs of youths. While the pace of urbanisation is very past, the
infrastructures provided are still insufficient. Recreational centres for youths are still
scarce and this is demonstrated by the lepak phenomenon among youths in Malaysia
because they are left with few alternative locations to spend their time.
According to the report, unstructured free time does not provide these young
people with a healthy lifestyle, but makes it easy for them to get involved in deviant
behaviours such as using pornographic materials (40% of respondents), sex before
marriage (18% of respondents), stealing (16% of respondents), smoking cigarettes (70%
of respondents) and drinking alcohol (25% of respondents).
The report concluded that the central problem was a form of escapism from
feelings of social failure, the pressure of modern life and the boredom in everyday lives,
especially for youths from working class families. Youths are idle because they have no
definite goals in life and are attracted to places such as shopping centres and video
arcades. This can be the paradoxical effect of capitalism whereby youths are targeted as
consumers and at the same time become potential threat to business outlets. They are also
keen on entertainment and trendy goods (under influence from the media and urban
lifestyles), and reading entertainment magazines. The lack enthusiasm and opportunity to
acquire the knowledge and skills to built a career.
The report also suggests four long-term strategies to overcome the problem. They
are: (i) an information strategy to change and mould the loafers' thinking, highlighting the
use of positive role models and religious teaching; (ii) appropriate activities to realise the
loafers' potential, using youth clubs and organisations to express intellectual creativity in

writing and business so as to upgrade their socio-economic standard; (iii) accessible
facilities to provide more information on activities run by community centres; and (iv) a
social intervention plan to control media and advertising so that they produce only positive
materials and role models to encourage a positive identity for teenagers. But why do
these youths loaf? Clearly one explanation is that they realise the system will never offer
them anything better than the drudgery of factory work. The lack of motivation and
initiative in these youths can be explained by the absence of promise, promotion or
incentives in the work place.

This issue then becomes a concern for the authorities

because they see this attitude threatening the march to industrialisation in Malaysia if
young people decide not to participate in the workforce. The concern is most serious in
industrial factories where there are insufficient local workers and a pressure to import
foreign workers because only foreign workers are willing to work in a bad environment on
very low wages. If modernity and industrialisation are faster than young people can cope
with, it is not surprising that some will opt not to participate because they feel left behind.
The above listing of problems and proposed solutions raises many issues and
questions that are important in the construction of the youth problem. Perhaps the most
pressing question is whether these social problems are especially a youth problem, or
apply to all levels of age groups in society. If we look at the perpetrators of incest, child
abuse, the spread of HIV and other social ills, it would seem that these are also the
problems of adults {The Star Online. 6/4/1997). Why then is there such great focus on
youth as being the root of all the problems and the major target for preventive actions? Is
it because youths in Malaysian society are poweriess to protest? Certainly, young people
in Malaysia have little opportunity to express their difficulties and frustrations because the

authorities and the media are looking for scapegoats without seeking to understand the
young themselves.
If the thrust of the Rakan Muda policy is geared towards getting young people out
off the street, clear from bad influences, and to preserve society's norms and values,
young people will find it hard to cope especially as the old set of values that have guided
Malaysians is under challenge from modernity, and there is no clear replacement. What
the older generation practised 50 years ago cannot be sustained in the face of
industrialisation, urbanisation and the influences of global mass media. Society cannot
adopt short-term measures and simplistic, mechanical solutions because these only
exacerbate the problems. The proposed solutions such as marrying earlier, caning,
punitive measures such as closing night-clubs early, giving teachers police powers, making
the poUce more powerful, or sending youth to character formation camps all reflect a
conservative mentality, when the demand is for change.
Influenced by the ideals of character formation and leadership outlined in Vision
2020 Policy\ Rakan Muda sought to reinforce the moral, religious and cultural values of
young people. From the late 1980's to 1990's the government became involved in the
"rescue" of the young. Youth policy became closely associated with both the "neglected"
and the "criminal", the so-called "at risk" groups. The government sought to form citizens
for a modern industrial society and came to assume more responsibilities for preparing the
young generation for the worid of work, occupations, national fitness and future
leadership. This can also be argued as part of the government's long-term policy to
encourage Malaysians, especially young people, to adopt the work ethic. The
industrialisation and expansion of the economy outlined by the government's New

Development Policy (NDP) cannot be sustained without a workforce that willing to work
hard in intensive industrial factories.

Thus, it becomes a concern for government if

"loafers" are unwilling to participate in this workforce (Cornish: 1994, p. 9).
But economic development cannot be achieved solely by adopting a capitalist work
ethic. For instance, it is clear in the case of poverty eradication that the government spent
huge sums on rural development in the 1960s yet found that the incidence of poverty did
not decrease {New Straits Times-. 22/2/1997, p. 8). The government then focused on
various poverty groups and tackled each group differently, but even this method did not
prove to be effective.
Young people had always figured as a target for "national fitness" thinking.
National fitness campaigns in principle allowed the government to substitute for parents in
relation to young people, and the politics of Rakan Muda arose out of the tensions in the
government's idea of it as a paternalistic movement to tackle youth problems {New Straits
Times. 6/3/1997, p. 1). The effect is an expansion of the sphere of the government in
young people's lives.
Intervention by government can be limited or extensive, symbolic or real. Rakan
Muda is an example where the government is clearly proactive. Government councils and
regional committees were set up, camps and hostels established, physical education
programmes extended, organisers appointed, seminars and conferences fiinded, central and
local facilities provided, and groups of key citizens with interests ranging from play groups
to camping mobilised.
It would be a mistake to assume that all of these activities had nothing to do with
the way young people themselves were becoming politicised. A newspaper article on

March 3, 1997 in The Star called for a more planned approach to undercut the drift of
young people. A few days after this report, there was another calling for a revolutionary
solution, coinciding with a period of activity by Rakan Muda, which sought to let young
people express themselves on training, education and other issues {The Star. 8/3/1997).
The government was responding not only to elite commentators, bureaucrats and
intellectuals but to the anticipated power of young people themselves.

^ Vision 2020 is a policy whereby the government aims to industrialise by the year 2020. This requires a
young generation that can lead the country besides becoming skilled workers, and participants in
commerce and other sectors of the economy. The young generation is also expected to become more
equipped with positive values and a spirit that will fulfil this goal.
(Ministry of Youtii and Sport: 1994, p. 3)

CHAPTER 5
5.0 Media construction of youth "problems" in Malaysia

It is very rare to experience first hand encounters with young people involved in
any sort of crime or deviant behaviour. Mostly our knowledge of their behaviour comes
from various forms of media-constructed news coverage.

News can usefully be

considered as "information that is timely, relevant to the concerns of its audience and
presented in a form that is easy to grasp" (Bennet: 1983, p. 125). Our lasting impression
of the youth crime we have never seen derives from media-supplied stories that seek to
arouse feelings in us about the event.
The major focus in this chapter is on the reporting of youth problems in Malaysia
in the 1990s.

The analysis concentrates on newspapers.

Both local and national

newspapers were monitored through newspaper clippings.
Findlay et al. (1984) analysed newspaper reports of a series of episodes where
police attempted to control disturbances originating out of leisure activities in an
Australian case study. They found that reportage in the press concentrated predominantly
on what the authorities had to say and that the material was often sensationalised (Findlay
et al.: 1984, p. 22). The same view can be applied to youth problems in Malaysia, where
the coverage of youth problems has been unbalanced while attempting to appear neutral,
and where the authorities (government, police and even the reporters) established through
the media a simplistic understanding of youth issues which served government policy.

5.1 Newspapers
Research findings in this section are based on 297 dippings from four separate
newspapers (two national and two from Sarawak) collected between January 1996 and
June 1997. Only articles directly concerned with youth problems and the Rakan Muda
programme were used. On any one day a single newspaper might have several articles on
these or none at all. While local newspapers covered these issues (Sarawak Tribune - 55
articles; Borneo Post - 45 articles), most of the articles are from the national newspapers
{New Straits Times - 100 articles; Berita Harian - 97 articles) published in Peninsular
Malaysia.
This study is not concerned with content analysis but rhetoric (Chapter 3, p. 38, n.
1) in an effort to reorganise the information into a form where it can be discussed in more
general terms. Qualitative approaches were not feasible in this study because material
was provided in a clipped and reduced form with the page numbers not supplied.
Material, however, was aggregated according to both time and the issues under
discussion.
I have divided the discussion into three areas. The first deals with arguments that
Rakan Muda can reduce youth problems.

The second focused on opposition to, or

sceptical views of, the programme. The third deals with the voices of youth.
Table 5.1 summarised views in the four newspapers either agreeing or disagreeing
that Rakan Muda acts as a youth crime prevention mechanism. A total of 231 articles
agreed that the programme can help overcome youth problems in Malaysia. These views
were based on the activities that the programme offers, especially the role of RML in
preparing young people as friture citizens.

Table 5.1: Does Rakan Muda act as youth crime prevention mechanism?
Newspapers

Agree

New Straits Times
Berita Harian
Sarawak Tribune
Borneo Post

Disagree

75
73
46
37

25
24
9
g

231 articles

66 articles

Positive opinions saw Rakan Muda as an answer to youth problems because it is
designed to prepare and teach youths how to behave according to acceptable norms and
values in society. Also, the training offered by Rakan Muda can prepare youths to meet
both work and school expectations {New Straits Times: 11/3/1997; Utusan Malaysia:
20/7/96, p.7).
The opposing 66 views argue that Rakan Muda fails to answer to youth problems
because there are other considerations that should be taken into account. These views
argue that youth problems do not entirely result from young people themselves, and
points to causes such as family problems, industrialisation and urbanisation, school and
the social expectations of young people {New Straits Times: 7/3/1997, p. 5).
Table 5.2 shows three origins of views in the 297 articles. The first category
represents views from public officials such as pohticians, police, community leaders, law
and order officials and NGO representatives. The second category is the general public,
characterised by adults who do not represent any institution or special position in society.
Their views are individual concerns about the youth issue. The third category is young
people themselves. Most views from this category come from youths who either wrote to
editors or were interviewed by news reporters.

Table 5.2 shows that a large majority of officials, a smaller majority of adults
(general public) and a slightly smaller majority (62.5%) of young people agreed that the
Rakan Muda programme provides an answer to youth problems in Malaysia.

The

difference between the general public and youth was very small (64% and 62.5%), but
both were much less positive than official sources. Rakan Muda received little discussion
in public before its implementation, so the less positive response among youth and the
public might be due to this. The media, on the other hand, will tend to propagate positive
views on the programme since the media is one of the government arms used to
strengthen its policy.

Public officials voiced positive attitudes on the programme's

capability to help young people and eradicate youth problems. This is not surprising in a
government programme. Obviously, arguments or comments from official sources have
a better chance of getting to press compared to powerless groups such as young people,
as the media has a great need to find readily available and credible people, whose social
role can be easily appreciated, to comment on a major news even.

Table 5.2: Does Rakan Muda act as a crime prevention mechanism?
(Opinion category)
Source of comments Agree %

Disagree

%

Total Comments

(%)

Public officials
General public
Youth

20
40
6

12
36
37.5

170
111
16

57.0
37.5
5.5

150
71
10

88
64
62.5

The majority of opinions in newspapers considered youth to be the problem rather
than social victims (Table 5.3). These data exemplify the general portrayal of the youth
problem in Malaysia. The majority of comments saying youths were a problem came

from public officials. Most of the general public also considered youth to be a problem.
It is interesting to note that the three youths also saw themselves as a problem rather than
as victims, but the majority (13 youths) disagreed. One conclusion from this is that it is
not impossible for youth to view themselves as a problem, especially when their thinking
has been influenced by the majority view. The attitude of such youths can be linked to
the information they gather from the media's publication of views from the public and
authorities.
Table 5.3: Youth as problem/victim (source of comments)
Source of comments

Youth as problem

Youth as victim

Public officials
General public

Ï2Ô
80

50
31

3

13

Youth

The media often have biased interests in their coverage of the youth problem.
Their creation of the fearsome (folk devil) image of young people helps to manufacture a
negative impression of youth, accompanied by negative pictorial images. It is rare for the
media to report on the decency of youths. On the whole the press has less interest in the
welfare of youth than in the problems they pose.

This press-created climate has

supported an increase in the powers of those in authority (politician, policy makers,
implementors and police), enhanced public control mechanisms and variations to laws
concerning youth leisure activities and lifestyle {The Star Online.

6/4/1997).

Government and media have aroused public anger with their claims that youth crime is
increasing, thereby raising panic amongst ordinary people. Since available data comes
from limited sources, people react to the simplistic linkage of rising figures on divorce,
abortion, single parenthood, physical abuse and declining family size with increasing
youth crime, and easily get the impression that the society is about to collapse. Media

coverage of young people's uses of leisure and their supposed delinquency or deviance
have appeared in different social and political contexts across Malaysia in the 1990s.
Sometimes the focus is on the activities of specific youth subcultural groups (e g bohsia,
bohjan, loafers); sometimes on leisure activities which are associated with specific
subcultures (e.g drug abuse, lepak, sexual practices). The context is always crucial here:
such panics are never entirely random events and they frequently reflect crises or
contradictions in wider structural relations (Cohen: 1985).
The moral panic over the youth problem arises in part from official concerns over
young people's activities outside direct adult supervision by parents, teachers or
employers. Such anxieties are reflected by the media. Officials view these young people
from the perspective of an outraged but respectable elite and crime becomes increasingly
associated with the activities of urban working class young people.

The latter are

represented as in need of protection from themselves, each other, unscrupulous adults and
the various temptations of urban life (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995).

Young

working-class women have been constructed as one source of such temptation, as well as
being seen as particularly at risk of involvement in criminal activities, and therefore as
also in need of protection (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995).
The major fiinctions of newspapers are to supply opinions, analysis and
descriptive information. Most newspapers rely on spokespersons' points of view rather
than those of youths. This is well demonstrated in Table 5.2 (page 77) where the voices
public officials (57%) were given serious consideration compared to those of youths
(5.5%).

Since almost all newspapers were owned by groups associated with the

government, it is not surprising that the news and commentary were mostly based on

public officials that favoured the government's position.

The fact that the press is

controlled by groups linked to the government means that critics of contradictory
opinions were rare.

5.2 Reactions to the youth problem
The immediate impression from newspaper coverage was that their interest in
youth problems was in line with authority opinions. It can be argued that newspaper
production requirements force the use of a story format around law-and-order issue, and
this may help to explain why coverage in many instances is superficial and prone to the
sensational (Walton: 1993). In some instances, newspapers will exaggerate coverage and
modify the story. For example, the coverage of youths hanging out with friends of the
opposite sex is often associated with immoral sexual activities even if they were only
discussing school work or simply relaxing. To create interest in these activities, they
have to be linked with a negative image such as immoral sexual activity.

This

exaggeration and modification of images attracts readers' attention, increasing the
demand for newspapers.
New coverage can follow a three-phase pattern, as explained by Wren-Lewis
(1981). The first phase is the lead-in revelatory stage where the representation of youth
problems draws on news values such as character, scale, immediacy and actuality which
make a forceful impact and place the events firmly in a law-and-order framework. WrenLewis notes that the media speak with one voice in this respect. The interpretative stage
presents the views of "privileged selections of speakers" (1981: pp. 15-33).

Here

politicians, police and community leaders define and contextualise the discourse firmly

within an established agenda.

In my research, data from newspapers show heavy

emphasis on public officials' views compared with any other category. The voices of
important and powerfiil authorities such as politicians and police officers are valuable
assets for news reporters because their views have a greater and almost immediate impact
on society. For example, after Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir mentioned many of the
social problems affecting young people, the effects were instantaneous and led to a moral
panic in the media over youth behaviour.

This is equally true when the newspaper

coverage portrays young people and their images more as a danger to society, especially
when these young people spend too much of their time in leisure activities {New Straits
Times-. 17/6/1994, p. 19).
The third and final stage Wren-Lewis calls "closure" where the coverage moves
to a discussion of prevention, implying a knowledge of causality.

At this stage the

narrative is closed, with no space for alternative readings. The debate, such as it has
been, is essentially over an official view that prevails through an assumed consensus,
meaning that alternative views are ignored or delegitimised.

Youth problems in

Malaysian newspapers were seen as concerns for prevention and solution.

Media

coverage focused on prevention and the coverage showed agreement with the majority
consensus that treated youths as a social problem. Contrary views form youths had little
impact, if at all. Their voices remained largely silent. Youths had little opportunity to
express the difficulties and frustrations they faced through newspapers because their
positions were of less interest to the media. In my sample, there were only 16 views
representing youth compared to 150 of public officials and 111 of the general publics
(Table 5.2: p. 77).

Media coverage of major social problems is done hastily and in a way that
accentuates fear. Some examples are the coverage that shows juvenile crimes on the
increase and the rising number of cases of drug addiction for young people under the age
of 18 (New Straits Times'. 22/2/1997, p. 9). The stories move through an introduction, a
climax and a resolution.

Deadlines and production requirements put pressure on

reporters to produce stories that are quickly understandable to a mass audience. A large
quantity of information is available but news has to be constructed from key or important
details that meet the criteria or newsworthiness - including being dramatic and of human
interest (Chibnall: 1977; Cohen and Young 1973). As a result, very little effort is made
to represent the complex issues that youths encounter in their lives.

5.3 Newspapers Headlines
Editorial decisions about the importance of news impact on the contents of
billboards, headlines and photos. Headlines are designed to attract people's attention to
articles in newspapers.

Although much thought may go into decisions about size,

typeface, page and location on the page, special skills are reserved for the choice of
words contained in headlines. Headlines about youth problems in my sample can be seen
as falling into four major categories:
1. Behaviours that might ruin the order and peace of society.
-

ECSTASY, NEGATIVE VALUES THAT SHOULD BE AVOIDED
HALF OF THE ABANDONED BABIES COULD NOT BE SAVED
CO-OPERATION VITAL ESi FIGHT TO CURB DRUG ABUSES, SOCIAL
ILLS
ALARMING RISE IN CRIME RATE AMONG JUVENILES
LOAFE^G AMONG YOUTHS, A SERIOUS PROBLEM, SAYS STUDY
JUVENILES CRIMES ON THE INCREASE

2. Actions to overcome the youth problem.
-

RISDA LAUNCHES VISION 2020 YOUTH FUND
PEOPLE TOLD TO HELP ERADICATE SOCIAL ILLS
MINISTRY TO HELP FIND SOLUTIONS
PARENTESiG COURSE MAY BE MANDATORY
YOUTH ORGANISATION (PEMUDA) HELPS OVERCOME SOCIAL
PROBLEMS
PM CALLS FOR UNIFORM SET OF VALUES
PM: STOP POLITICISING YOUTH PROBLEMS AND HELP TACKLE THEM

3. Official references to political figures.
-

RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION IMPORTANT FOR YOUTHS,
SAYS YAP
DR. WONG: MANY CHALLENGES YOUNGER GENERATIONS HAVE TO
FACE

4. Use of statistics.
-

7,444 JUVENILE CASES INVOLVED STUDENTS
ONLY 40 PER CENT YOUTH ORGANISATION STILL ACTIVE

-

13,486 NEW ADDICTS IDENTIFIED LAST YEAR
To look at the full range of headlines here is impossible. However, the use of

stronger control measures was called for in many headlines. Edwards (1975) referred to
the key role that headlines, photographs and captions can play in bringing distortion and
bias to stories. From a study of articles headed with references to "drug", Bell (1982)
noted that, because of frequent coverage, the effect of such references may be the
amplification of vague and threatening connotations that terms of this sort can develop
when linked to criminality. Instead of a providing broader picture about drugs (such as
the abuse of nicotine and alcohol) newsworthiness limited the public's concern in this
area to narcotics associated with crime.
Dramatic headlines point to the plots and themes of articles, are devised to attract
attention, and in many instances suggest an editorial stance. Certainly the idea of youth

problems touches on many social concerns that the press monitors - youth violence,
confrontation with authority, drugs, gang fighting, illegal motor racing and so on. These
are the problems that attract public attention and are easily sensationalised. The impact
of this type of coverage leads to immediate calls for prevention and solution. One of the
examples links youths' problem to the role of the family. In response, the National Unity
and Social Development Ministry proposed that a parenting course be mandatory for
those concerned {New Straits Times. 3/3/1997, p. 6). Another example sought to penalise
youths for going to entertainment outlets and to instruct these outlets to stop their
operations earlier than before {The Star Online. 6/4/1997).

5.4 The account of youth problems is officially shaped
The depiction of the youth problem and related issues presented to the public was
thus highly restricted and constructed from the ideological vantage points of authority.
Davis and Walton (1983) argue that in news constructions the "official accounf of an
even is predominantly selected. My data from newspapers supported this argument with
official accounts representing 88% of views agreeing with government policy. The news
claims to be presented from a neutral and objective stance, but this fiction is based on the
notion that the presented material relies on what the reporter observed, what the
microphone recorded and what the camera saw.

It seems more likely, as Bennet

comments "that the professional practices embodying journalism norms of independence
and objectivity also create conditions that systematically favour the reporting of narrow,
official perspective" (1983, p. 76). This is an important issue because the press accounts

of the youth problem that predominate and inform people's outlook comes to be regarded
as the true and objective account of the problem.
Secondly, newspapers have to publish on a daily basis.

In gathering news,

reporters are faced with the problem reporters develop a "round structure" which Baker
(1980: p. 162) describes as a "format within which news organisations can routinise the
process of handling the unexpected". That is, news gatherers institutionalise a network of
contacts in organisations such as courts, police, trade unions, parliaments and the like that
allow them to gain rapid access to events which may be unfolding in their "rounds". This
gives them access to authorities' comments but also leads to an increased reliance on
what authority figures have to say. Baker is on the view that the repeated use of authority
figures increases their "news value" to a level where their presence and comments are
regarded as news in its own right, and the evidence in my research tends to support this
view.
I have noted above that the views of youth have generally been poorly
represented. In an attempt to redress this imbalance, I now proceed to explore some of
the views of young people directly involved in the Rakan Muda programme.

CHAPTER 6
6.0 The young generation and their struggle for a place in society

The young generation in Malaysia is said to act in opposition to the dominant
beliefs, attitudes and practices of the majority of the population, and this is seen as a form
of resistance to the values of society (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1995, pp. 3-13). The
lives and interests of the young people, however, including their friendships and
relationships have been shown to develop as a part of complex social changes and are not
necessarily associated with or related to any conscious desire to oppose the dominant
values of society (Ariffm: 1995; New Straits Times'. 5/3/1997, p. 6; New Straits Times.
7/3/1997, p. 6; New Straits Times. 27/2/1997, p. 8).
Young people seek solutions to problems that concern them in their immediate
world. Their access to knowledge, power and their opportunity to develop life skills will
influence how they perceive themselves, their world and its problems, and the solutions
that are available to them.

As a person's knowledge about their options for self-

development expands, so their perceptions of the world are cast in a different light.
What leads young people, particularly those who have experienced social,
economic and educational disadvantage, to see greater possibilities for themselves in the
world? What will help young people solve their problems in productive and socially
useful ways?
The areas of concern identified by Rakan Muda deal with young people and their
potential involvement in crime. I have therefore focused on how Rakan Muda fiinctions
as a crime prevention mechanism. This chapter is based on the experiences and opinions

related by 30 young people who participated in interviews in Sarawak. They give their
views on possible solutions to the social problems associated with them, on issues of
empowerment and on the capacity and creativity of individuals to exercise power over
their own lives.
The interviews were intentionally semi-structured, with participants freely
encouraged to set their own agenda for discussion, and all respondents talked
spontaneously about the issues of youth crime and Rakan Muda. The small sample sixe
and deliberate subjectivity of the interview style mean that these stories cannot be relied
upon to provide firm conclusions or applications regarding the problems of young people
in Malaysia generally. Since almost all participants (26 out of 30) are members of Rakan
Muda, their opinions become a good source of feedback on whether this programme
really helps them in dealing with everyday expectations and hardships. It is hoped that
their stories will be of particular value to those working in welfare field, both in direct
services and policy-making.
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the Ministry of Youth and Sport (1994) sees those
individuals aged 15 to 39 as the target of the Rakan Muda programme. However, I chose
those aged between 15 and 26 as my respondents because they are seen by the Ministry to
have a greater risk of crime and deviance involvement besides being characterised as the
resourceful generation in the Vision 2020 goals.
As noted in Chapter 1, no similar research on youth has been done in Malaysia,
not in relation to the youth groups in Sarawak. My thesis then can be treated as a pilot
study for more extensive research. The closest study done by government only relates to
''the loafing behaviour among teenagers'' (Ministry of Youth and Sport: 1994). And this

differs from my thesis because I am looking at the role of the Rakan Muda programme as
a general crime prevention mechanism rather than looking at specific sub-group
activities.

6.1 Rakan Muda and social control versus the powerless young generation
The interviews were conducted in Kuching, the capital of Sarawak in East
Malaysia. Among the respondents, fifteen were male and fifteen were female. They
were introduced or made know to me by my relatives and friends who were members and
staff oi Rakan Muda programmes. Four respondents (three females and one male) were
not members oi Rakan Muda. In the interviews, participants were asked to comment on
both the positive and negative aspects of Rakan Muda programmes. One of the questions
that I asked concerned the role of Rakan Muda as a government programme which
attempts to mould young people to modern industrial values. The government believes
that its Vision 2020 goal cannot be achieved unless Malaysians, especially young people,
re-organise their culture to fit the government's capitalist ends. As expected, these young
Rakan Muda members held these views:
(i)

Rakan Muda trains members to become good citizens, teaching members
not only to be responsible for themselves but also others;

(ii)

Rakan Muda teaches members to obey the law and preserve order.
Members are trained not only to discipline themselves but also how to
differentiate what is right and wrong;

(iii)

Rakan Muda helped members in dealing with social relations and
expectations. Some respondents recalled their behaviour before joining
the programme where they used to rush into doing things without really
having a thought for the consequences. They recounted a pass where they
often reacted unreasonably and irrationally, which risked getting them in
trouble with others. Now they realised that it is important to act with
thought. The four non-members also held these views;

(iv)

Rakan Muda can operate as a crime prevention mechanism and was very
usefiil in helping young people to protect themselves from getting
involved in deviant behaviour or crime. Some of them considered the
programme was a good government initiative to lessen the crime
associated with young people; and

(v)

Rakan Muda taught them skills and knowledge about which they had
learnt very little before, such as character formation, job skills, training
and social expectations.

I would argue that the above views indicate that attitudes, knowledge, and skills
more than anything else are what young people find helpful in sorting out their lives.
Family, school and peers do play important roles in young people's lives but these
influences come from outside Rakan Muda. The views also highlight the crucial role that
young people thought Rakan Muda played in helping to protect them from the dangers of
involvement in crime and delinquency and in educating them how to achieve a satisfying
life.
Government intervention to control the behaviour of young people and
punishment in terms of preventive coercion is seen by the authorities as an essential part
of this control. However this also means that participants in a programme like Rakan
Muda might be pressured to behave according to society's values. Opinions from the 30
young people show that they are unaware of the programme's role as a social control
mechanism. The majority of respondents believed that they have little power to resist or
voice their fhistrations about society, but they seem to agree on what is expected from
them so that they will be accepted by society. This is not to say that they do not have an
urge to rebel, rather that they have been pressured to follow what society expects from
them. That is to follow the norms and values make available by society. The majority

who do resist (such as those who lepak) found that they were stigmatised but felt that
they had done nothing wrong. Some respondents explained:
We don't do unlawful things like stealing or harassing people but we lepak, we do
it just to relax. Usually we just window-shop because we don't have enough
money to buy all the things we see.
(Respondent 5)
The interviews focused on personal experiences of official perceptions of youth
and the social problems associated with them. Some of the thoughts and experiences that
these youths had about their lives, Rakan Muda and its effects show them to be loyal
participants in the power game played by the authorities.
Media stories characterise the young generation as subjects for control, and this
helps to shape the belief system of these young people as to how society works. Clearly
media coverage of youth stressed the importance of young people conforming and
obeying social norms and values.

Adults in society are depicted as having a

responsibility to educate young people with appropriate norms and values.

Young

people's image in the media is often that of a subordinate group to adults, which
reinforces the responsibility of adults to shape the behaviour of these young people.
Most young people given a voice in the media express this view {l<iew Straits Times:
1/3/1997, p. 13; New Straits Times'. 7/3/1997, p. 6; New Straits Times, 7/3/1997, p. 7;
New Straits Times: 3/3/1997, p. 5), and all of my respondents also held this view. They
argue it is very wise to follow social norms and values to avoid getting into trouble.
When I asked what they regarded as a serious crime associated with youth in the
media, almost all of them agreed drug addiction was the most serious crime, then
abandoning babies, theft and illegal motor racing. Like most adults, my respondents also

agreed that media reports suggested an increase in youth crime. They agreed with this
view because they believed the media had based its coverage on vahd statistics. Their
responses show that they believed the media play an important role in transmitting
information and they are easily convinced by the news. However, it is not clear why they
believe this. A possible explanation is the sources used when the media focuses on youth
crime, as this news might seem more convincing when it is coupled with opinions from
authorities.
Almost all the respondents agreed with the statement that the young generation
today appeared to spend too much of their time "hanging around" (lepak) public places
such as shopping malls, movie theatres and recreational parks. The media can amplify
(Cohen: 1973; Young: 1971) young people's presence in public places by anticipating the
threats posed by their behaviour.

There were negative comments from respondents

indicating discontent with media images of young people.

For example, some

participants commented that "loafing" was not a problem before the media took more
notice about what the young generation did. However, some comments did provide
support for the view that "loafing" in shopping malls disturbs the peace and smoothness
of trade in those places.

Clearly this view serves the needs of capitalist business.

Business people usually see young people loafing around shopping malls as a threat
because they feel that loafers might disturb their customers, or cause trouble such as
stealing or fighting.

6.2 Young people, families and peers
Many respondents commented on the role of the family in social control:

A comment I would like to make is, people don't realise how some young
people's parents treat them and how it makes life harder having parents that
always disagree with them and pick on them all the time.
(Respondent 5)
I think parents should be better informed on today's problems so they can advise
their children on how to stay clear of crime and choose for themselves (how to be
independent and in control of their own lives). The problem youths have is not
being able to communicate with their family, especially parents. I am so lucky
and have understanding parents. I am not totally "straight" and I used to be
involved in trouble and in everything. I guess I am lucky that I have pulled
myself out of it and now have discovered there is more to live for. If all youths
had more people to talk to then young people today would be far better off and
clear from any sort of trouble.
(Respondent 12)
Such comments illustrate an area of young people's lives which causes much
conflict for both young people and their parents alike. Youth is typically a time when
relationships with parents are reassessed and re-negotiated as young people move
towards independence and adulthood. Families play a crucial role in young people's
lives and the family is acknowledge by these 30 young people to be the social institution
that has the most significant influence on their development. Parents act as role models,
standard setters and reward granters in cognitive development and self-concept, in
identity achievement and sex-role identification.

For example, some respondents

commented:
Parents should condition and reward their children with love and care. Parents
have to understand the needs of their children, especially when they are in their
early teens. This is the essential period where children want attention from
parents because at this stage they have to fight outside influences (pressure from
peers).
(Respondent 17)
Parents have to learn to give and take with their children too. They have to give
children a chance to express themselves and be ready when they need

encouragement and motivation. Parents play an important role in socialising their
children to be good and responsible adults when they grow up.

(Respondent 18)
Parents are the models for children. A good example usually produces a good
breed. Both of my parents are very open minded. I can talk about almost
everything. They do not judge me if I have problems or am in trouble. They are
there to help.
(Respondent 19)
The physical as well as emotional presences of parents are extremely important
during growing up. When I was growing up, I could always count of both my
parents, but especially my mum, to be there when I needed them. It made a lot
different and shaped my direction in life.
(Respondent 5)
Parents teach society's norms, values and belief However, the power exercised
by members of the family is not always as obvious as the power held by government,
capitalists, law enforcement officers and others. One possible reason proposed by my
respondents is that parental power is reinforced with love and care. Even though there is
no definite conclusion from the interviewees' responses, they do agree that parents are
responsible for monitoring their children's behaviour, both inside and outside the home.
Children will have less of tendency to deviant or criminal involvement if they get
constant reminders from their parents. One respondent in particular suggested that:
Support of the family is crucial to youths and those who do not have strong
support from parents are more likely to become involved in undesirable
behaviours.
(Respondent 20)
If parents are unable to control their children's behaviour, there is a tendency for
youngsters to look for other means to satisfy the loss of parents' attention, and peers can

fulfil this role. Where young people associate with the wrong company and are exposed
to bad influences, the government sees the need to interfere through Rakan Muda. While
members are in care of the programme, the facilitators and supervisors will act as parents
to these young people (Ministry of Youth and Sports: 1995). Rakan Muda provides them
with parental support, especially religious teaching and inculcating social norms and
values. Programme facilitators thus seek to act as role models.
Ochiltree (1990) suggests that, generally, young people in Australia take their
major values in life from their parents. Most young people in Malaysia also look upon
their parents as their primary role models, though there is a trend during the adolescent
period towards the increasing importance of peer relationships. Peer groups provide vital
intimate feedback to youths at a time of rapid personal and social change and enable them
to communicate with others as equal partners. The major function of friends and peers is
to provide a base of security and socialisation outside the family. As some respondents
commented:
"that relationship with peers or friends allows young people to begin the process
of emotional detachment from parents. The separation process takes place over a
period of years and doesn't usually mean that youths suddenly reject their parents
or their parents' values. Instead, they gradually let go in order to learn how to be
emotionally self-supporting individuals".
(Respondent 20)
In most cases, peers play an important role in the
Being with peers, they can be influenced to do not
deviant behaviour. But my friends who I hang out
they listen to me if I have problems that I cannot
know, young people also have secrets.

life of the young generation.
only good behaviour but also
with are very helpful because
share with my parents. You

(Respondent 4)

The values of parents and peers are both important for young people in the
process of achieving independence (Offer and Offer: 1975). Where there is less parental
interest or in areas of parental uncertainty young people are likely to turn to the peer
group for help and advice (Hunter: 1985), but parental and peer influences are not
necessarily contradictory (Kandel and Lesser, 1972). However, parents' counsel is more
often preferred to that of peers in important situation involving values and decision
making (Smith: 1976). Comments from participants suggest that they usually respect
their parents when dealing with major decisions such as jobs, fiirthering education and
some extent social relationships.

Data from newspapers also presents the view that

parents play the most crucial part in the life of most young people {New Straits Times:
7/3/1997, p. 6; New Straits Times'. 1/3/1997, p. 1).
In Malaysia, it is typical for youths to stay with their parents until they are
married.

Out of 30 respondents, 27 of them were staying with both parents, 2

respondents were staying with foster parents while one was living with a single mother.
Thus, it is not surprising that my respondents value their parents' opinions when they
deal with most decision making, as parents still play an important part in their lives.
Sixteen out of thirty respondents lived in villages situated approximately 100
kilometres from Kuching, while the rest come from Kuching itself It is common for city
residents to be migrants from suburban or rural areas. Even though 14 respondents in my
study were born in Kuching, their parents were migrants who stayed in Kuching because
of the jobs and economic opportunities that Kuching has to offer.

20 out of 30

respondents were not working while 10 were employed, mostly in service and delivery
jobs. The highest wages range from RM900 - RM700 per month for government jobs

(teacher, nurse and assistant researcher, respectively). The lowest pay is for a nanny,
earning about RM300 per month.

Other jobs were factory worker (RM600), driver

(RM800), self-employed (RM500 - 600) and a blue-collar job (RM600).
Some of my respondents (17) are still studying. Those who are not working are
totally dependent on their parents' support. This is a common characteristic of Malaysian
families. It is a responsible of parents to support children who are not married and not
working. This is especially the case of female children. Parents have ftill responsibility
for female children, even if they are over 20 of age. Given this common characteristic, it
is normal for.female to depend more on their parents compared to male children.
Generally both gender depend on parents until they are married and started their own
family.

This parent-child nature of relationship produce greater impact on children

decision making. Even children that have moved temporarily (to job place) from parents
dwelling consider parents' opinions are still very important in their lives. They often
consult their parents first before making any important decision.

6.3 The young generation: can they change the negative image?
A small number of my respondents argue that they should be given a space in
society, either in the policy making process or in sharing information with the news
media. Participants argued that they want their views to be heard by authorities when
designing policies for them.

Clearly from their comments they felt that had little

opportunity to express the difficulties and frustrations they face.

For example, one

respondent argued that:
Young people who spend too much of their time hanging out should not be
blamed fully because parents, the government or perhaps every member in society

may in some way or another have contributed to the existence of the problem.
Perhaps there are not enough facilities provided to cater to the needs of young
people. So it is for authorities in the country to sponsor youth activities and
provide more facilities. At least they will know where to go or what to do with
their free time if there are facilities available. Maybe there will be no time to
gossip and make fun of others when all their time is occupied with structured free
time.
All respondents felt that all sections of society had to work together to combat
social problems in the country. According to them, such problems are not confined to
one group but are rather the concern of all. The potential solution suggested by the
respondents is broader discussion and searching for ways to prevent the problem from
becoming worse. The participants believe that every member in society, young and old,
has to work together to keep society free from crime. Searching for a solution to the
problem is the responsibility of all and no one group should blame others if they want to
solve the crisis. For example, some respondents claimed that:
Government, police, teachers, parents and young people themselves have to work
together to find answer for the problems. It is no time to accuse each other for not
playing the right role.
(Respondent 3)
We should stop pointing fingers but realise that social problems are everybody's
responsibility and everyone should be doing something to solve the crisis.
(Respondent 13)
I think parents alone are not to be blamed. Schools, the community and even the
government should play their part to overcome social problems.
(Respondent 21)
Deviancy is not an inherent status but something that is conferred by society, by
social reaction (Cunneen and White: 1995). Labeling can produce criminal behaviour if
those labelled

face prejudice from other members of society, because their

disappointment or finstration might then lead to them to commit crime. What is the use
of conforming to society's norms and values if members of society already stigmatise
you? According to Becker, the impact of social reaction on certain types of behaviour or
particular categories of people is crucial to explaining the criminalisation process:
"Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes
deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as
outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person
commits, but rather of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an
'offender'. The deviant is one to whom the label has successfully been applied;
deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label". (Becker: 1963, p.9).
Despite weaknesses, the important contribution of labeling theory is that it shows
how labeling can construct deviant behaviour. From the interviews, it is clear that social
labeling is applied to some groups of young people and actually generates further
"deviant" behaviour in the group so labelled.

Some respondents recalled such

experiences:
I remember some of my friends told me they are being called bohsia only because
they talk to boys. But they did nothing, just discussing their school work at one of
the shopping centres. One of my girlfriends got angry and said nasty words to
those people who called them bohsia earlier. The argument became offensive and
at the end they had to leave before security interfered.
(Respondent 12)
Imagine we are labelled as criminal, what we will we do? Besides feeling
different and inferior, I personally feel less motivated and fhistrated. I might
choose to isolate myself from society that I feel is mean and unfair.
(Respondent 19)
Government, society and the media play a share in producing deviants among
young people, either through control or through the promotion of moral panic over their
behaviour and attitudes.

In Malaysia, there is still limited understanding about the nature of young
people's lives, the reason why change is possible for them and how this change can come
about.

Although the interview sample is very limited, it shows how participants'

opinions can open up a basic understanding of the needs of young people.

These

participants characterised their lives as a process of seeking solutions in circumstances
with limited options rather than resisting any concrete authority.

There is no conscious

intent on their part to strike out at the system, rather to survive within it. Thus, I see the
need for the authorities in programmes like Rakan Muda to level themselves with young
people in order to understand their needs. This goal can be achieved by research and by
listening to how young people conceptualise youth crime and their alternatives.
Although the number of participants involved in this study is very limited, their
comments shed important light on the ways they think about their own experiences.
Government and media perceived them as a serious problems of urban life. They were
regarded by the authorities as engaging in rebellious acts {lepak, bohsia, bohjan and
involvement in fundamentalist Islamic groups) against the norms and values of society
and the state. The state's tendency to characterise the actions of young people as a social
problem bears little resemblance to the explanations and accounts proffered by young
people themselves.
The government and media have to understand the position of young people. The
young should be given more chances and space to voice opinions and needs.

The

introduction of the Rakan Muda youth programme by the government, for example,
places greater importance on the deeds rather than the needs of young people. This
government initiative seems to be concerned primarily with the management and control

of young people's behaviour than with addressing the root of cause of their problems, and
young people participating in the programme sense this.
I will now seek to draw together some of the major elements in my research and
their implications for the Rakan Muda programme.

CHAPTER 7
7.0 Conclusion
In recent years social changes have given young people greater self-determination
at steadily younger ages and rapid industrialisation and modernisation mean that current
social expectations of youth are problematic. The process of growing up is complicated
when the route to adulthood is not clearly marked out. The Department of Statistics
(1997) and the Ministry of Youth and Sport in Malaysia (1995) classify those aged 15-39
years as "young people", a subsection of Malaysian population who are considered by the
Ministry to be "at risk". Those who have reached the age of 16 can marry and apply for
driving licence, but they cannot "hang out" in public places with friends of the opposite
sex without receiving censure or being questioned by people in authority.
During the growing up process young people are exposed to a larger number of
variety of role models, both at home and elsewhere. As society becomes more diverse,
the range of social roles and choices available to most youths increase dramatically. Yet
the ways in which young people select roles are hard to predict because political and
moral values have become more diffuse as industrialisation produces a more pluralistic
society. Greater freedom for young people carries more risks and costs for errors in
judgement. Dropping out of school, being out of work, teenage pregnancy, sexually
transmitted diseases, drug addiction and crime are powerful examples of the price that
some young people pay for their extended freedoms. The impact of making "wrong"
choices on individuals, their families and the wider society underscores the need for a
better understanding of youth development and lifestyles.

Social changes have created new constraints, experiences and opportunities for
Malaysian youths, in a context where even well-established social institutions are subject
to change.

The family unit is one example of how a social institution has been

transformed, with an increase in nuclear family and single-parent homes. Changes in
social attitudes towards, and expectations for, young people have occurred in many
spheres of life.
The Rakan Muda programme can be seen as a governmental response to these
changes, driven both by a desire to fit young people into the new structure of society and
by a fear of the consequences of "wrong" choices.

7.1 Review of fíndings
This thesis has attempted to look at the Rakan Muda programme from a variety of
perspectives. No other study has done this, and the limited research time available in my
own work has meant that the findings here are necessarily of an exploratory nature. The
three perspectives - from government, media and youth - indicates directions in which
future research can proceed.
After Chapter's one brief overview, in Chapter Two I reviewed the literature on
youth crime, social control policy and intervention.

I also briefly discussed and

contrasted development and social changes in Peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak.
Government policy in the Peninsular is often adopted in Sarawak regardless of the
differences in social and historical conditions. Development in Sarawak on the other
hand has produced problems that are urban centered (King: 1990, p. 116), aggravated by
the tendency of young people from rural areas to move to major cities. The process of

adaptation to a new urban environment created dilemmas for most of them. Meanwhile,
youths who originated from city dwellings were also prone to anti-social behaviour
because they could not cope with the rapid social changes that accompanied
development. In all situations, young people were more likely to be blamed for their
deviant behaviour because they had little power to voice their needs and issues. Chapter
Three discussed the methodology that was used in this study. There were three sources
of data: government materials on Rakan Muda\ newspaper clippings' and interviews with
30 young people in Kuching.
This thesis, unlike other similar research in Malaysia, has attempted to provide
some understanding of the young generation and how they view their involvement in
Rakan Muda. Chapter 4 noted that there is a changing focus in young people's leisure
pursuits. The interplay of individual factors and social environment directs young people
towards particular pursuits in their leisure, and the nature of this is important to
understand. Major social changes involve a whole range of personal and social factors from individual character formation to the role of adults and peers in the formation of
cultural and social values, and the effects of the wider society's norms and expectations,
including those of government and the mass media.
The Ministry of Youth and Sport (1995) has highlighted the distinction between
coercive and voluntary participation in youth programmes. The analysis of government
materials suggests (1996) that any programme will have appeal for young people only if a
genuinely voluntary status is introduced and controls reduced to minimum. At best,
Rakan Muda provides young people with a temporary relief from the stresses and strains
engendered by structural disadvantage. Many participants will undoubtedly experience

positive outcomes in terms of gaining new friendships and acquiring new skills, and some
may indeed learn effective ways of dealing with the grind of everyday life. However,
although participants may experience short-term benefits from the Rakan Muda
programme, there is little or no evidence to suggest that there are any lasting behavioural
changes, or that such changes necessarily add anything new to prevent young people
from engaging in criminal or delinquent activities.
To assume that short, intense periods of participation in activity-based schemes
can fundamentally address issues of structural disadvantage is, of course, absurd, and the
proponents of the Rakan Muda schemes would be the first to acknowledge this. Equally,
however, such initiatives cannot wholly be dismissed since they clearly bring some
benefits to participants. However, there is still puzzlement as to why there has been some
drastic increase in young people's involvement in crime and deviant activities. Rakan
Muda, it seems, provides young people with new skills but does not guarantee they will
stay clear of criminal behaviour. In final analysis, then, the liberal intentions of Rakan
Muda activities are best viewed as an attempt by the government to regulate and control
the use of time and space of a growing number of marginalised and alienated young
people (Pratt: 1990, pp. 219-42; Polk: 1993). The control of this group of young people
aimed to protect the public and business interests, while at the same time encouraging
youth to conform to the new demands of capital and industry.
The Fifth Chapter investigates media constructions of youth crime. One
significant set of results showed the important contribution of authority voices in the
reporting of youth crime by the media. Media images tend to portray young people as
purveyors of trouble or as a threat to society. The media plays the role of amplifying

negative images of sexuality and morally deviant young people. The terms ''hohsid' and
''hohjan" are the results of media construction and the use of dismissive labelling was
common: "criminals", "social ills", "wasteful youths". Such labelling had the effect of
removing the necessity for any sort of sociological explanation of young people's
activities. According to Hall (1978b) the media's approach to forms of behaviour such as
hooliganism has sat comfortably with a political authoritarianism that has demanded a
"toughening attitude" towards all forms of social permissiveness:
"the temptation grows to deal with any problem, first by simplifying its causes,
second by stigmatising those involved, third by whipping up public feeling into a
panic about it and fourth by stomping down hard on it from above" (1978b, p.
34).
In Malaysia, the phenomena such as lepak, bohsia and bohjan not only caused
moral panic but also recommended the authorities to put forward a midnight curfew for
teenagers. Even though, this curfew matter was only a proposal, somehow it shows that
this is the result of moral panic regarding youth leisure activity.

It has also been

suggested that night-clubs, bars, karaoke lounges and other places of that nature be
limited and discouraged. The stereotyping of deviant youths in the media deepens the
fears of Malaysian society about losing the fliture citizens of the country. It is evident
from the media that older people in the country are more concerned with the future than
the current welfare of youths. Older people often express their frustrations with young
people who lack responsibility, discipline and knowledge.

They argue that these

deficiencies in young people limit their involvement in Malaysia's development. Most
comments and suggestions in the media viewed youths as the problem rather than as
victims of industrialisation and modernisation in Malaysia. The processes of labelling
and deviance amplification have helped the media to construct the youth "problem". The

issue of whose interests and ownership are served by the media is clear from the majority
voices it represents. In the latter case, the New Straits Times and the Berita Harian are
both closely associated with United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysia's
largest and ruling political party. Meanwhile the Borneo Post and the Sarawak Tribune
are controlled by an active veteran politician in Sarawak.
The analysis of media coverage of the youth problem was counterposed by
interviews with young people in Kuching, Sarawak (Chapter 6). These interviews were
important, because often in policy development and the news-making process, youth
voices are given little or no prominence. Results from the interviews showed that young
people in the Rakan Muda programme tend to support the majority view that youths are
the problem rather than being victims in today's Malaysia. According to the
interviewees, they gained not only life skills but also a better understanding of how to
behave according to the accepted norms and values in society. Directly or indirectly, all
respondents confirmed the majority beliefs that require young people to conform more
closely to the law and social order, and saw it as a mistake to resist the system. However,
the limited sample cannot be assumed to represent the voices of all youths in Malaysia.
Rather, it should be treated as a pilot study for broader and more in-dept research,
highlighting the need to see how young people conceptualise their own circumstances
and problems.
In relation to families, a research finding was that respondents and their parents
have less stormy relationships than might be generally imagined. Parents remain an
important influence throughout the respondents' transition to adulthood, helping them to
form their sense of self and shape their future life choices. Where important values.

future plans and attitudes are concerned, these respondents appear to be largely in
agreement with their parents. A generation gap in terms of fundamental values seems to
be a somewhat erroneous idea, and further research on this might provide new directions
for Rakan Muda activities. All respondents accept their parents as behavioural models
and sought to develop a lifestyle compatible with upbringing and experiences.
In this chapter too, it was clear that the peers of the interviewees often supported
traditional parental attitudes and beliefs and looked to work in concert with, rather than in
opposition to, adult goals and achievements. Peer influences may become more
important for young people whose access to parental influences is impaired. While being
an atypical, these youths appeared to understand and select from a broad range of societal
values and behaviours.
A strong and consistent finding among all participants was that they have been
given too little scope to express the needs and problems in their lives. They believe that
they are not totally responsible for their misbehaviour, and argue that a cause of this is
the fact that there were not enough facilities available to cater for their needs. From this
position, they argued that every member in society has to play a part in solving the youth
problem.
For many youths, adult-led organisations are major sources of structured leisure
time activities, creating a context for meeting friends and observing adult role models.
Rakan Muda is one such programme, but its rationale and mode of implementation show
there is a need for a more systematic assessment of how it structures youth-adult
interactions and mentoring roles. A major limit on this research, and in Rakan Muda
itself, is the lack of ethnographies of young people's lives that would help us to

understand the ways in which young people use and perceive their leisure and social
environments. There is also a need for an anthropological perspective on the meaning
and significance of leisure activities for young people in future research. I hope that this
thesis, despite its limited scope, offers some insight into how this process might begin.

Appendix

Date:

Case no:

Questionnaire to obtain data on young people opinion on social and
cultural problem in Malaysia.
This questionnaire is confidential; nothing that could identify a respondent, workplace or
employer will be used in my report.

01. Sex
02. Age
03. Grade
04. Do you come fi'om a village, small town or large town/city?
%

05. If young person is employed, please indicate:
a. length of time in present job (years/months)
b. nature of duties
c. name of profession, industry or business
d. approximate earnings
06. Where is the young person's permanent home considered to be?
1.
2.
3.
4
5
6
7.

With natural Mother and Father (married)
With Mother living alone
With Father living alone
With natural Mother and Stepfather
With natural Father and Stepmother
With other relative or guardian (specify please)
With person unrelated to the young person and not legal guardian (specify
please)
8. Other (specify please)

07. Parents' Employment:
Nature of
duties

Industry,
If part time,
profession or please state
business
no. of hours

Length of
time
employed

Mother
Father

08. Housing
Is the parental home:
Rented (council)
Rented (private)
Owner occupied
Owner occupied (mortgaged)
Other (Please specify)

No. of rooms:
Living
Bedrooms
Kitchen
Bathroom
Garden

09. Is the parental home:
Terraced
Detached
Semi-detached
Mobile Home
Other (Please Specify)
10. Siblings of the young person:
No. staying in
the same home
Sisters
Brothers

No. staying
somewhere else

Approximate
earnings

11. Malaysian government established 'Rakan Muda' as a youth program that can help to
produce citizen with good moral value and identity. What is your opinion on 'Rakan
Muda' program as a crime controlling mechanism? Do you think 'Rakan Muda' helped
young generation from involving themselves in crime and immoral misconduct?
12. In your opinion, what are the most serious social problems associated with today's
young generation? Newspaper coverage stated that social problems of the young are
increasing. Do you agree?
13. Loitering in pubUc places is one of the social problems associated with young
generation in Malaysia. What is your reaction to this statement? Why?
14. Do you think young generation are influenced by their peers to participate in crime?
Do you think 'loitering' can influence young generation to get involve in crimes and
immoral behaviour? Why?
15. Family upbringing and neglecting are among the factors that can influence young
generation to involve in deviant behaviour. Do you think parents are responsible to control
their children from involving in immoral behaviour and crime? If Yes, in what way? If
No, why not?
16. Social and cultural problems that are said related to young generation can be solved if
all parties (government, teachers, police, parents, young people and the public) work
together to prevent these problems from happening. What is your opinion?
17. Some people say calling the young generation deviant prompts them to be different.
What is your opinion?
18. 'Bohsia' and 'Bohjan' are used to describe young females and young males who are
perceived to practise multiple sex partners. Does this lifestyle worry you and do you
know any of them personally? In your opinion, what make them choose this lifestyle?
19. Possible way of tackling social and cultural problems is by bringing young generation
together to try and give them the opportunity to voice what they want. Do you agree with
this statement and how do you think it will work? Do you think that young generation
have been given enough opportunity to voice their opinion on solution for problems
affecting their life? Why?
20. Young generation are also responsible for their deviant behaviour. How and in what
way are young generation responsible to control themselves from getting involve in crime
and delinquency?
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